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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE EFFECT OF SHORTENED REPORTING LAG ON THE 
USEFULNESS OF FORM 20-F 
by 
Zhenfeng Liu 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Steve W. Lin, Major Professor 
This study examines the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
decision to accelerate the Form 20-F (20-F) filing deadline on the usefulness of 20-Fs. I 
find that only the large and medium firms experienced a significant increase in market 
reaction when they accelerated their 20-F filing deadlines to four months after the year-
end, while no significant change in market reaction is detected for small firms. I also find 
that the market did not appear to have reacted to firms who voluntarily further shortened 
their 20-F reporting lag to less than four months after the year-end. Finally, I find that 
firms that comply with the SEC’s policy to shorten the 20-F filing deadlines are more 
likely to restate the financial statements, but the 20-F readability and the possibility of 
amending their 20-Fs do not seem to be different, compared to the matched non-
acceleration firms. Taken together, this study provides consistent evidence suggesting 
that the four-month 20-F filing deadline is beneficial for larger firms while causing no 
burdens to small firms, and that the accelerated 20-F filing deadline may increase the 
timeliness of 20-Fs at the expense of the reporting quality.  
iv 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                               
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
decision to accelerate the filing deadline of the Form 20-F (hereafter “20-F”) on the 
informativeness (i.e. the ability to affect share price or trigger trading volume) and 
reliability (i.e. the probability of significant restatement or omissions in financial 
statements)  of the 20-F. Similar to the Form 10-K (hereafter “10-K”) of U.S. domestic 
firms, foreign private issuers 1  (FPIs) file 20-Fs that serve as comprehensive annual 
reports to the SEC. For more than 30 years, these FPIs had been allowed to file their 20-
Fs to the SEC no later than “six months” after the year-end (Meek, 1983). With 
technology advances that enable companies to process and disseminate information more 
quickly, investors’ ability to evaluate and react to information in a shorter timeframe, and 
investors’ expectation to receive information on a faster basis, this “six-month” deadline 
was considered outdated and controversial by the SEC and investors (Choi and Meek, 
2011). Effective for the fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2011, the SEC 
requires all the FPIs to adopt the new “four-month” deadline for their 20-F filings (SEC, 
2008), in an attempt to address the concern that unduly delayed periodic report 
information may reduce the value of information to investors (SEC 2005).  
                                            
1 “Foreign private issuer” generally refers to the foreign firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. market. Its 
definition in Exchange Act Rule 3b-4(c) is: any foreign issuer other than a foreign government, except for 
an issuer that (1) has more than 50% of its outstanding voting securities held of record by U.S. residents 
and (2) any of the following: (i) a majority of its officers and directors are citizens or residents of the 
United States, (ii) more than 50 percent of its assets are located in the United States, or (iii) its business is 
principally administered in the United States. 
2 
The 10-K and the 20-F are regarded as the most comprehensive and detailed sources 
of financial information available to equity investors. They often contain very important 
information about firm performance, financial position, cash flows, and corporate 
governance disclosures that is not normally available at earnings announcements. The 
extant literature has provided extensive evidence that 10-Ks contain information content 
that is useful for investors (e.g. Qi, et al., 2000; Griffin, 2003; Asthana et al., 2004; 
Callen et al., 2006; You and Zhang, 2009; De Franco et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 
2013). However, extant literature on the information content of 20-Fs provides rather 
mixed results2 (e.g. Meek, 1983; Etter et al., 1999; Olibe 2001; Chen and Sami, 2008, 
2013; Kim et al., 2012), possibly because the different filing requirements and 
information environment between the 20-F and the 10-K result in different extent to 
which the investors attach importance to the information contained in the financial 
reports: (1) compared to the reporting deadlines of 10-Ks3, which range from two months 
to three months depending on firm size, the “six-month” deadline for 20-Fs is much 
longer. Such a long filing delay may cause investors to search for other venues to obtain 
the information that is contained in the 20-F, thus making the information in 20-Fs less 
relevant and valuable. (2) While 10-Ks only permit U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) reporting, 20-Fs allow the use of U.S. GAAP, International Financial 
                                            
2 Meek (1983) does not find market response to 20-K (renamed to 20-F now) releases. Etter et al. (1999) 
find that the market reaction to 20-Fs became significant after 1988. Chen and Sami (2008, 2013) find that 
income reconciliation to U.S. GAAP in 20-Fs is informative to investors, but Kim et al. (2012) do not find 
the elimination of reconciliation item causing information loss in 20-Fs. 
3 The deadline for filing Form 10-K is: 60 days for large accelerated filer, 75 days for other accelerated 
filers, and 90 days for non-accelerated filers. For further explanation of Form 10-K filing deadlines, see 
SEC Final Rule 33-8644 (issued on December 21, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/33-8644.pdf. 
3 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), or other local GAAPs4, creating additional barriers and 
uncertainty to U.S. investors when incorporating the financial information contained in 
20-Fs into stock price adjustments. (3) To ensure foreign securities’ accessibility to the 
U.S. market participants and to strengthen the competitiveness of U.S. exchanges, the 
SEC impose less strict 5  disclosure requirements on 20-Fs than on 10-Ks, such as 
requirements on segment reporting and executive compensation, thus making 20-Fs less 
informative than 10-Ks. (4) Since not all FPIs are domiciled in countries where English is 
their first language, the readability of 20-Fs may affect how accounting information and 
corporate disclosure are perceived by U.S. investors (Brochet et al., 2012; Lundholm et 
al., 2014), and how efficiently 20-F users process accounting information and disclosures 
(Lehavy et al., 2011). (5) Foreign firms usually suffer from the “home bias” effect, a 
phenomenon whereby investors allocate a higher percentage of capital to domestic firms 
than to foreign firms, even when this allocation is inefficient (Cooper and Kaplanis, 
1994). Taken together, investors may attach less importance to the information content 
contained in 20-Fs than that in 10-Ks.  
However, many actions have been taken to improve the information environment of 
FPIs in the U.S. For example, the SEC encouraged both U.S. and foreign firms to use 
plain English in preparing financial statements (SEC, 1998), permitted the use of IFRS as 
issued by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in 20-F reporting without 
further reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (SEC, 2007), and accelerated the 20-F filing 
                                            
4 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reporting firms were required to provide a 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP in the 20-F until 2007 when the SEC eliminated this reconciliation 
requirement. But the exemption only applied to firms using IFRS as issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Firms using other versions of IFRS, or other local GAAPs are 
always required to provide a reconciliation to US GAAP in the 20-F.  
5 For example, foreign private issuers are permitted to disclose executive compensation on an aggregate 
basis and need not supply a Compensation Discussion & Analysis, as is required for domestic companies. 
4 
deadline to no later than four months after the year-end (SEC, 2008). However, very little 
is known about whether these new developments have helped improve the 
informativeness of 20-Fs. This study therefore empirically investigates whether the 
accelerated 20-F filing deadline brings net benefits (i.e. benefits minus costs) to investors 
by examining both the investors’ responses upon 20-F releases and the reporting quality 
of 20-Fs following the SEC’s new rule to shorten the 20-F filing deadline to four months 
after the year-end. 
While not mutually exclusive, the relevance and reliability of financial reports are 
most of the time conflictive (Schipper and Vincent, 2003), and therefore shortening the 
reporting lag of 20-F might result in trading off reliability for relevance. On one hand, a 
shortened deadline for filing 20-Fs may provide investors with more timely or relevant 
information for their investment decision-making. On the other hand, as the 20-F filing 
deadline is shortened by two months, it puts financial statement preparers under greater 
pressure to work more efficiently while maintaining the same level of accounting and 
reporting quality of the 20-F. Working under such extra burden might cause the financial 
statement preparers to make less effort in ensuring overall 20-F quality, in terms of 
accounting information accuracy, disclosure quantity and quality, and the entire annual 
report’s readability. As stated in SFAC No. 8, “sometimes, one enhancing qualitative 
characteristic may sometimes have to be diminished to maximize another qualitative 
characteristic”. Dolye and Magilke (2013) document evidence that increased timeliness 
of 10-Ks jeopardizes the reporting reliability for certain types of firms. Therefore, 
shortening the 20-F filing deadline by two months might unexpectedly lead annual 
reports to become more erroneous, harder to read and understand, or more incomplete. As 
5 
a result, the net benefit of shortening the 20-F filing deadline becomes unclear ex ante. In 
this study, I investigate investors’ responses to the change in the 20-F filing deadline, 
which allows me to evaluate the net benefit (or loss) of accelerating the 20-F filing 
deadline. In other words, a significant increase (decrease) in market reaction to 20-F 
releases under the new deadline should provide evidence of net benefit (loss).  
In order to capture the informativeness of the 20-F after the acceleration of 20-F 
filing deadlines, this study uses both price and volume to measure the market reaction to 
20-F releases, as there is extensive literature indicating that both price and volume can 
react differently to the release of information (e. g. Beaver, 1968; Kim and Verrecchia, 
1991). While trading volume reflects individual investor’s heterogeneous expectations 
based on new information by summing all market trades, security price change is a 
function of aggregating investors’ beliefs at the market level. For example, if investors 
interpret a piece of information differently, those who interpret the information positively 
will buy the security from those who interpret the information negatively, generating 
trading volume reaction. However, if the adjustment of investors’ beliefs are largely 
counterbalanced, one could not observe significant price change. As a result, market 
reactions using price and trading volume will generate different results. Therefore, using 
both price and trading volume allows me to analyze market reaction in a more 
comprehensive manner. In order to examine the reliability consequences of accelerating 
the 20-F filing deadline, I also employ a difference-in-differences method to test whether 
accounting quality, reporting quality, and readability are significantly different between 
the treatment and matched sample firms in the pre- and post-acceleration periods.  
6 
Using a matched-sample design, I first identify firms that shortened the 20-F 
reporting lag to four months after the year-end or even less, and then match these firms, 
based on industry, size, and year, to a set of firms that did not shorten their 20-F reporting 
lag. I then employ both level analysis and change analysis to investigate whether there is 
a difference in market reaction (change) between the treatment and matched (i.e. non-
acceleration) sample. In the change analysis, I compute firm-level differences in the 
absolute value of the market reaction for each firm between the year of acceleration and 
the year before acceleration for both the treatment and the matched sample. Using the 
within-firm differences allows me to use each firm as its own control, and to mitigate 
concerns about potentially omitted firm-level variables.  
This study finds 454 FPIs that consistently filed 20-F during 2008 to 2011, and 
further identifies 230 FPIs that shortened their 20-F filing deadline6. However, only 187 
FPIs have data available for further analysis. As previously mentioned, these firms are 
matched with another 187 FPIs that are in the same industry, have similar total assets at 
the fiscal year-end, and file 20-Fs in the same time period, but did not change their 20-F 
deadlines during the test period. I find that most firms (159 out of 187) shortened their 
20-F reporting lag from six or five months to four, three, or even two months, and 28 
firms that had already been filing their 20-Fs within four months in the past also further 
shortened their filing deadline. In terms of timing, more than half of the acceleration 
firms (100 firms) made their changes in 2011 (which is the compliance deadline year) 
and the rest of them were early changers (31 firms in 2010; 28 in 2009; 28 firms in 2008).  
                                            
6 Slightly less than 200 firms originally voluntarily filed their 20-Fs within four months, so they might not 
be affected by the new SEC regulation to shorten their 20-F filing deadline further. Some firms are 
dropped due to sample selection criteria described in section 4. The 247 FPIs are identified before 
checking data availability for empirical tests. 
7 
In addition, 136 firms (72.7%) shortened their reporting lag to four months, while 51 
FPIs (27.3%) further shortened the reporting lag to less than four months. In terms of 
firm size, most of the firms that accelerated their reporting lag are larger firms, with 45% 
and 34% of the acceleration firms being large accelerated filers (hereafter “large firms”) 
and accelerated filers (hereafter “medium firms”), respectively, while only 21% of the 
acceleration firms being non-accelerated filers (hereafter “small firms”)7. 
Because the SEC 2008 regulation only require the 20-F be filed no later than four 
months, to test whether the four-month deadline affect the usefulness of 20-Fs, my main 
sample of interest is the 136 firms that accelerated their 20-F reporting lag to four months, 
which comply with the SEC 2008 regulation with no further voluntary acceleration. After 
controlling for levels and changes in firms’ financial position, accounting practice, and 
20-F readability, multivariate analyses overall show that acceleration firms have 
significantly larger (change in) abnormal returns, but marginal (change in) abnormal 
trading volumes, from the pre-acceleration to the acceleration periods. I further partition 
the sample into small, medium and large firms and find that the larger firms experienced 
a significant increase in market reaction, but the small firms experienced no significant 
change in market reaction. This is partially consistent with the findings in Doyle and 
Magilke (2013) studying 10-K deadline accelerations, and the notion of “diseconomies of 
scale”, which predicts that when all firms face the same preparation time cut, larger firms 
have more financial resources and better infrastructure to support the execution of 
shortening the 20-F filing deadline. This result is also consistent with the SEC (2008) 
                                            
7 The filer status for an Exchange Act reporting company is determined by its worldwide market value of 
outstanding voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates, i.e. public float.  Large 
accelerated filers have $700 million public float or more; accelerated filers have less than $700 million but 
no less than 75 million public float; and non-accelerated filers have less than 75 million public float. 
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statement that the all the firms in different sizes should have the ability to file the 20-F 
with a four-months deadline. Additional tests reveal that the weak abnormal return in the 
main test is mainly attributable to non-Chinese firms experiencing no abnormal trading 
volume, whereas Chinese firms experienced significant abnormal return. Further 
investigation also show that further shortening the filing deadline brings little to no 
benefit to the firms. As a whole, the market reaction analysis suggests that shortening the 
20-F reporting lag benefits larger firms, and the investors have more heterogeneous 
interpretation on Chinese firms’ 20-Fs.  
The difference-in-differences tests examine whether the shortened 20-F deadline 
affects reporting reliability and readability, and I find that with less preparation time for 
20-Fs, the acceleration firms demonstrate a significantly higher probability of issuing a 
restatement (6.67% higher) in the medium firms sample alone, no change in the 
likelihood of issuing amendments for 20-Fs, and no difference in 20-F readability, 
relative to the matched non-acceleration firms.  
Taken together, the results in this study suggest that shortening the 20-F filing 
deadline has a significant impact on the relevance (informativeness) and reliability of the 
20-F. The new “four-month” filing deadline appears to be appropriate for now, because 
any further shortened reporting lag does not seem to result in any additional net benefit. 
However, due to sample size limitation, whether the four month deadline could be further 
accelerated requires more future research with larger sample. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study provides the 
first empirical evidence on the net benefit of the SEC’s decision to accelerate the 20-F 
filing deadline. I find that large firms get net benefit from the accelerated reporting lag of 
9 
20-F, while small and medium firms do not suffer net loss, confirming the 
appropriateness of the four-month reporting deadline for foreign firms. However, I find 
that accelerating the 20-F filing deadline could entail a lower level of reliability and 
jeopardize the overall quality of 20-Fs for medium firms. Second, the results of this study 
should be of interest to the SEC when evaluating the recent heated discussion over further 
accelerating the 20-F filing deadline. I find that if firms further shorten the reporting lag 
to less than four months, the market does not reward this further acceleration, and 
therefore might contribute to the heated discussion now as to whether it is necessary to 
further accelerate the 20-F filing deadline.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides institutional 
backgrounds of the recent SEC rule to eliminate the reconciliation from other IFRS to 
U.S. GAAP and shorten the 20-F filing deadline. Chapter 3 reviews the related literature 
and develops my testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the research design. Chapter 5 
discusses the sample selection and the empirical results, and Chapter 6 summarizes this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                              
REGULATION BACKGROUND 
This chapter outlines the some important reporting requirements for foreign firms 
that are listed in the U.S. These reporting requirements are closely related to the event of 
interest and the variables in this study. 
 
2.1 The acceleration of 20-F filing deadline  
Beginning in 2002, the SEC started to shorten the 10-K filing deadline in an effort to 
improve the usefulness of periodic reports for investors (SEC, 2002). In 2005, the SEC 
finalized the 10-K filing deadlines to 60 days after the year-end for large firms, 75 days 
for medium firms, and 90 days for small firms. However, FPIs were permitted to file their 
20-F no later than six months after the year-end. This deadline was established more than 
30 years ago, and the original purpose of permitting FPIs to file the 20-F late was to 
accommodate the different disclosure and filing requirements in their home jurisdictions. 
As technology has advanced rapidly over the past decades, foreign firms are now able to 
gather and process information on a much more accelerated basis (SEC, 2008). In some 
jurisdictions, annual report deadlines have already been shortened to 90 to 120 days8.  
In addition, as more FPIs are reporting their financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS as issued by the IASB, they are no longer required to prepare a reconciliation from 
IFRS to U.S. GAAP in the 20-F (SEC, 2007). Before 2007, foreign firms that prepare 
their financial statements in accordance with accounting principles other than the U.S. 
GAAP must provide a reconciliation that quantifies any material differences between the 
                                            
8  For example, the annual report deadline is four months after the year-end for the European Union listed 
companies, 90 to 120 days for Canadian listed firms, and three months for Israeli listed firms. 
11 
amounts determined under the foreign accounting principles and the amounts that would 
have been resulted from U.S. GAAP. However, other foreign firms, either using their 
local GAAP, or using other versions of IFRS, still need to reconcile to U.S. GAAP. 
As a result, the SEC changed its requirement that FPIs file their 20-Fs no later than 
four months after the year-end beginning for the fiscal year ending on or after December 
15, 2008, although FPIs have the option to file their 20-Fs earlier than four months after 
the year-end. The SEC also provided a transition period of three years, which means that 
all the FPIs must comply with the new four-month deadline effective for the fiscal year 
ending on or after December 15, 2011. Although there are three deadlines for filing 10-
Ks depending on the firm size, the 20-F filing deadline is fixed at four months after the 
year-end, regardless of firm size. 
 
2.2 The Form 6-K requirements  
The Form 6K is an SEC filing submitted to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission used by FPIs to provide information that is: (i) required to be made public in 
the country of its domicile; (ii) filed with and made public by a foreign stock exchange on 
which its securities are traded; or (iii) are distributed to security holders.  The report must 
be furnished promptly after such material is made public. This is the only information 
furnished by FPIs between annual reports, since such issuers are not required to file 
quarterly reports (Forms 10-Q) or ongoing current reports (Form 8-K). 
More importantly, because there exist differences of disclosure regulations among 
different countries, firms from countries with less reporting requirements and firms that 
are solely listed in the U.S. might submit fewer 6-Ks to the SEC between 20-Fs. 
12 
Therefore, with uniform requirements for all the FPIs and mandatory deadline, the 20-F 
is a more important and useful venue for investors to obtain comprehensive and detailed 
financial and corporate governance information of the FPIs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
        This chapter reviews the prior literature on the information content of SEC annual 
reports (i.e. Form 10-K and 20-F), size effect on the market reaction to information 
release, and trade-off between reporting relevance and reliability, and then develops 
research hypotheses based on the literature. 
 
3.1 The incremental information content of the 20-F 
A firm makes an earnings announcement when the earnings are ready after the fiscal 
year end. The earnings announcement mainly provides a firm’s performance in the past 
year, and is regarded as the most important information disclosure to the public. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that a considerable body of research find that earnings 
announcement is informative (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, 1968; Beaver et al., 
1980; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Bernard and Thomas, 1989). Another important 
financial disclosure is the annual report. While the earnings announcement focuses on 
reporting earnings and related information, it is typically less than 10 pages, and does not 
provide a full set of financial statements or notes. In contrast, the SEC annual report is 
typically more detailed, sometimes about several hundred pages long. It includes detailed 
information such as company introduction, organizational structure, executive 
compensation, equity, subsidiaries, audited financial statements and statements, 
management discussion and analysis of operation, etc. The annual reports are 
undoubtedly the most comprehensive financial information available to investors. The 
detailed financial information and corporate disclosures in the annual reports are likely to 
14 
be disclosed for the first time to the public and therefore can be used to alter market 
participants’ belief in the firms’ future performance. Therefore, when 20-Fs and 10-Ks 
are released to the public, one should expect that the market participants react to the 
information contained in the annual report by trading the securities. However, in the pre-
EDGAR9 period, previous studies generally fail to detect the market reaction to 10-Ks 
(e.g. Foster and Vickrey, 1978; Stice, 1991; Easton and Zmijewski, 1993) and 20-Fs (e.g. 
Meek, 1983; Etter et al., 1999; Olibe, 2001). Meek (1983) uses an event study method to 
investigate the information content of foreign firms’ earnings announcement and Form 
20-K (the predecessor of Form 20-F), and find that there exists price market reaction to 
earnings announcement but not to 20-F release. Etter et al. (1999) employ intraday 
trading data to examine the informativeness of the 20-F across different classes of 
investors, and fail to find abnormal trading activities around 20-F filing dates for sample 
period 1983 to 1992. However, they find some evidence that the informativeness of 20-F 
increased in post 1988 filings, which corresponds with a dramatic increase in the market 
value of the FPIs in the U.S. market. Olibe (2001) uses 1994-1996 data, which lie in the 
transitional period of EDGAR system phasing-in, and find that there exists unexpected 
returns but no corresponding market trading response. He attributes the lack of market 
reaction to investors’ lack of easy access to the disclosures.   
As a matter of fact, the failure to detect market reaction to 20-Fs and 10-Ks could be 
largely due to the fact that there was a significant delay in making these forms available 
to the public. Usually after a firm files the annual report (either a 20-F or a 10-K) to the 
                                            
9 The EDGAR system started to phase in from 1993, and all paper filings were eliminated from 1997 so 
that all the firms would submit electronic SEC filings through EDGAR, and the SEC filings would be 
free of charge, twenty-four hours after being submitted, to investors on the SEC website. 
15 
SEC, it will take about one week before the annual report is available for public access. 
Furthermore, the annual report is made available only in the public reading room, making 
it harder for common investors to access it. In the post-EDGAR era, where free online 
access is available for 10-K and 20-F filings one day after being filed, recent studies (e.g. 
Qi, et al., 2000; Griffin, 2003; Asthana et al., 2004; You and Zhang, 2009; Christensen et 
al., 2013) provide consistent evidence that 10-Ks provide investors with useful 
information and market participant trade using these pieces of information. More 
specifically, Callen et al. (2006) find that news about expected returns, accruals, and cash 
flows contribute to some of the stock price adjustments upon 10-K releases. Similarly, De 
Franco et al. (2011) find that detailed footnote information partially contributes to the 
informativeness of 10-Ks. Although there are no published studies (to the best of the 
author’s knowledge) which directly examine the information content of 20-Fs in the post-
EDGAR period, several studies examine the information content of IFRS-U.S. GAAP 
reconciliation in the 20-F. For instance, Harris and Muller (1999) find that Form 20-F 
reconciliations from International Accounting Standards (IAS) earnings to U.S. GAAP 
earnings are value-relevant. Henry, Lin, and Yang (2009) find that net income 
reconciliation from IFRS to U.S. GAAP during the period of 2004–2006 is value-relevant 
using a market valuation model. Chen and Sami (2008) document a significant positive 
relation between the magnitude of the income-reconciling amount from IFRS to U.S. 
GAAP and abnormal trading volume, indicating that the reconciliation item has 
incremental information content. In addition, Chen and Sami (2013) find that the 
information content of earnings reconciliation for traders is stronger for first-time IFRS 
users than for continuous IFRS users.  
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However, researchers find inconsistent results regarding the elimination of 20-F 
reconciliation. Jiang et al. (2010) document no changes in abnormal trading volume, 
abnormal return volatility, or bid-ask spread following the 20-F reconciliation elimination. 
Kim et al. (2012) find no evidence that reconciliation removal is negatively associated 
with a firm’s market liquidity, probability of informed trading, or cost of equity. Based 
on this evidence, they conclude that the SEC’s decision to end the 20-F reconciliation 
requirement did not result in information loss or greater information asymmetry for the 
affected firms. In contrast, Byard et al. (2011) find that removal of the 20-F reconciliation 
has a detrimental effect on affected firms’ information environment in terms of 
information transfer. 
Based on the fact that 20-Fs and 10-Ks are both comprehensive annual reports for 
firms listed in the U.S., and play an important role in information communication 
between managers and investors, and according to prior literature on 20-Fs in the pre-
EDGAR period, it is reasonable to argue that 20-Fs in the post-EDGAR period may 
contain useful information for investors. However, unlike domestic firms that are 
obligated to file quarterly report “Form 10-Q” to the SEC, the FPIs are not required by 
the SEC to file quarterly reports. Therefore, with less relevant information about interim 
reports on firm performance, investors of the FPIs may face a higher degree of 
information asymmetry than those of the domestic U.S. firms. Compared to the 10-K, the 
20-F should play an even more important role in communicating financial results and 
corporate disclosures with U.S. investors. I, therefore, argue that the 20-F contains useful 
information content. 
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With the assumption that 20-F is informative, the next question will be whether the 
informativeness will decrease as the lag between the fiscal year-end and the 20-F release 
date increases. Because outdated information is likely to have lower or no information 
value and could also mislead investors in revising the expectation of firms’ intrinsic 
values, it is reasonable to argue that accelerating the 20-F filing deadline could 
significantly increase its relevance by allowing for greater use of the information on a 
timelier basis (Dolye and Magilke, 2013). With more timely information, investors can 
integrate more concurrent and extensive information to make better-informed decisions. 
This leads to my first hypothesis in the alternative form: 
        H1: The magnitude of the market reaction to the 20-F release is larger in the 
acceleration period than in the pre-acceleration period. 
 
3.2 Firm size and overall benefit from shortened reporting lag 
Firm size has always been an important factor when the SEC implements new 
corporate regulations. For example, in implementing the Section 404 (b) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200210, the SEC kept postponing the deadline for non-accelerated filers (i.e. 
smaller firms in this study) because the SEC believes that “the compliance costs are 
likely to be disproportionately higher for smaller public companies than larger ones”, and 
“a deferred implementation of the auditor attestation requirement to save non-accelerated 
filers the full potential costs”11. When shortening the 10-K filing deadline in 2005, the 
                                            
10 SOX Section 404 (a) requires management of public companies to assess and report on the effectiveness 
of the internal control over financial reporting, and 404 (b) requires external auditor to attest to and 
report on the adequacy of the management’s assessment of internal control over financial reporting. 
11 SEC Final Rule 33-8934 (issued on June 26, 2008), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2008/ 
33-8934.pdf 
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SEC (2005) clearly acknowledges that, “Smaller companies appear to have access to 
fewer financial resources and less well-developed infrastructure to support the further 
acceleration of the reporting deadlines. For a given disclosure, diseconomies of scale may 
cause smaller companies to face greater costs of acceleration than larger companies.” 
However, when shortening the 20-F filing deadline, the SEC argued that “the size of the 
issuer would not affect its ability to file the 20-F on an expedited basis. Rather, the issue 
was whether the foreign private issuer was required to prepare a second set of full 
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP, or a reconciliation from their home 
country accounts to U.S. GAAP.” While the second sentence in the SEC quote is 
plausible, in a sense that preparing for extra financial statement information will be time-
consuming, there is no evidence to support its “size” argument. It is unclear why the SEC 
have a different view on the “size effect” on the potential cost of filing deadline 
acceleration for U.S. domestic firms and FPIs. Doyle and Magilke (2013) find that, when 
shortening the 10-K filing deadline from 90 days to 75 days, the medium firms actually 
experienced a significant decrease in market reaction to 10-K releases, while the large 
firms received no change in market reaction. But when shortening 10-K filing deadline 
from 75 days to 60 days, the large firms experienced a significant increase in market 
reaction. This finding indicates that the cost of reducing the time to prepare 10-Ks 
outweighs the benefit of timelier reporting for the medium firms. Similarly, the small 
firms may be more likely to experience a net loss after the 20-F filing deadline was 
shortened to four months after the year-end12. This leads to my second hypothesis in the 
alternative form: 
                                            
12 According to SEC (2005) final rules, small firms do not need to accelerate their 90 days 10-K filing 
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        H2: Accelerating the 20-F filing deadline results in less overall usefulness to 
investors for smaller firms. 
 
3.3 Overall 20-F quality after the accelerated filing deadline 
As clearly discussed in the FASB Conceptual Framework, the qualitative 
characteristics of information, i.e. reliability and relevance, are important to financial 
reporting quality. Reliability addresses how financial information users can rely on it to 
be materially accurate, how faithful it represents the information, and how it can be 
verified and used consistently. Relevance addresses how financial information helps 
users to make appropriate decisions pertaining firm future performance, or confirming or 
correcting past decisions they have made. Standard setters, such as the SEC, FASB, and 
IASB, believe that reliability and relevance are both necessary for financial information 
to be useful for decision making, and have been trying to increase the quality of both. 
Reliability and relevance have been extensively studied in the accounting literature. Most 
of the accounting research, however, focus on the reliability and relevance of accounting 
measurements (e.g. Schipper 2003; Dye and Sridhar 2004; Kadous et al.,  2012; Zhang, 
2012). They argue that reliability and relevance of accounting measures are either 
inversely or directly related. The relation between reliability and relevance of financial 
reporting as a whole, however, is not well studied. In a similar setting to this study, Doyle 
and Magilke (2013) find that when large firms shorten their 10-K filing deadline from 75 
days to 60 days, the reporting quality significantly increases, but when medium firms 
shorten their 10-K filing deadline from 90 days to 75 days, the reporting quality 
                                                                                                                                  
deadline. Therefore, Doyle and Magilke (2013) do not study small firms in their paper. 
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significantly decreases. Their results show that the decision by the SEC to shorten the 
filing deadline for 10-K reporting firms causes different effects on the reporting 
reliability. In other words, whether there necessarily is a trade-off between relevance and 
reliability depends on the cost and benefit of more timely accounting information. 
For the setting of this study, a shortened 20-F filing deadline increases the timeliness, 
and therefore the relevance of the financial information, but meanwhile, taking two 
months away from the foreign firms’ financial reporting preparation may have a negative 
impact on the quality of financial statement and the audit process for the following 
reasons. First, to meet a tighter filing deadline, firms might choose to reduce their 
disclosure to the minimum amount of the information required by the SEC and 
subsequently submit other voluntary disclosures through the Form 6-K. Second, firms 
might choose to meet the deadline at the expense of the accuracy of accounting 
information. Third, firms might make errors if they are under pressure to meet the new 
filing deadline and do not have sufficient time. Fourth, the external auditors might 
overlook some potential issues in financial statements and the internal control system, 
causing potential misstatement in the audit opinion. All the above potential drawbacks 
could cause subsequent restatements or submissions of Form 20-F/A13, leading to the 
following hypotheses in the alternative form: 
H3a: The accelerated 20-F filing deadline results in higher possibility of issuing 
restatement and amendment to 20-F; 
 
                                            
13 Form 20-F/A is an amendment to Form 20-F. 
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In recent years, researchers begin to put more emphasis on another qualitative 
characteristic of annual report quality-the readability (Li, 2008; You and Zhang, 2009; 
Miller, 2010; Lehavy et al., 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Lundholm et al., 
2014). They argue that less readable annual report is more difficult to interpret and 
process by investors because it requires that investors devote more time and effort to 
identify and extract information, and they find that readability is positively related to firm 
performance and efficiency of market response to the disclosure. Therefore, the 
readability is an important quality element of annual reports, in terms of how effective 
the firms can communicate its financial information with the investors. Different from 
10-Ks, which are generally prepared by native speakers of English in the U.S., 20-Fs are 
prepared by foreign issuers who may speak a different language (Lundholm et al., 2014), 
and therefore might require some translation. Due to linguistic complexity, the 
complicated translation process might result in potential information loss and lower 
clarity of the disclosure, i.e. lower readability. Therefore, readability may play a more 
critical role in 20-F disclosure quality than in 10-K disclosure quality. 
With less time to prepare for the financial reporting due to the accelerated 20-F 
filing deadline, by the similar reasoning on the reporting reliability in H3a, it is plausible 
to argue that the foreign firms might less time and largely ignore the readability issues. In 
terms of priority, firms would focus more on reliability issues to avoid subsequent 
restatements or amendments, because lower readability does not necessarily irritate the 
SEC and results in a subsequent revision of the 20-F. Therefore, the less attention on the 
readability might lead to lower readability. 
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However, one can also argue that the acceleration of filing deadline might not cause 
lower readability. First, foreign firms might have long been hiring fluent English 
professionals to prepare 20-Fs and therefore does not have a issue with complex 
translation. Second, as most parts of the 20-F remain the same over the years of reporting, 
foreign firms might just use previous year’s 20-F as the template, and just replace old 
numbers with updated numbers, and follow the same sentence patterns to make new 
corporate disclosures. If these reasons are the real case for the foreign firms, then I expect 
no change in readability of 20-Fs. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether the 
readability is lower after firms shorten their reporting lags. I posit my hypothesis in the 
alternative form: 
H3b: The accelerated 20-F filing deadline results in lower readability. 
 
In the next Chapter, I discuss the research design that is used for the empirical tests 
in this study.  
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CHAPTER 4                                                                               
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Event windows 
I follow the traditional event study design to investigate the short-term market 
reaction around the filing date of 20-Fs. To explore investors’ reaction to 20-F releases, I 
employ different test windows, i.e. windows (0, +2), (0, +3), (0, +4), (-1, +2), (-1, +3), 
and (-1, +4), to capture the market reaction around the filing date. Each day in the test 
windows are trading days excluding weekends, holidays, and other circumstances when 
the stock market is closed. These windows take into account the information leakage, and 
the delay of the 20-F made available to the public. Since prior literature starting from Ball 
and Brown (1968) has confirmed the information leakage before earnings announcement, 
I start trading windows with day -1. As a matter of fact, even if a firm submits its 20-F 
filing document to the SEC on day 0, it takes the SEC less than 24 hours14 to process the 
document before it is released to the public on EDGAR. That means day 0 might not be 
the first day that the investors trade on the information in the 20-F. Furthermore, as is 
observed from the data, a significant amount of the firms file their 20-Fs late in the 
afternoon, when the stock market has already closed. Therefore, if the SEC spends 24 
hours to make 20-Fs public, the public will be trading on the information contained in 20-
Fs two days later. For example, if firm ABC files its 20-F on day 0 at 6:29 pm, and the 
SEC makes the 20-F public on day +1 at 6:00 pm, the stock market is closed on day +1. 
The earliest that the investors can trade on the 20-F information will be on day +2 when 
the stock market opens in the morning. All the discussion above taken together, day -1, 
                                            
14 Ideally, the EDGAR system ensures 24 hours maximum of processing before accepting a filing and 
making it public on the EDGAR system. 
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day 0, and day +1 could all possibly be the days that the 20-F information is not being 
traded on. I thus included day +2, day +3 and day +4 in the trading windows as the days 
that the 20-F information may being traded on. 
 
4.2 Event study method 
I employ both price and volume to measure the market reaction to 20-F releases, as 
there is extensive literature indicating that both price and volume can react differently to 
the release of information15 (e. g. Beaver, 1968; Bamber, 1987; Kim and Verrecchia, 
1991). Although one can expect both price and trading volume reaction upon information 
release, one should also expect the fact that there might be trading volume reaction but no 
price reaction, or there might be price reaction but no trading volume reaction. This is 
because although both price and trading volume might reflect the same underlying 
economic factors, they might capture different levels of investors’ responses. Trading 
volume reflects individual investor’s heterogeneous expectations based on new 
information by summing all market trades, whereas security price change is a function of 
aggregating investors’ beliefs at the market level. For example, if investors interpret a 
piece of information differently, then trading volume might be high. Those who interpret 
the information positively will buy the security from those who interpret the information 
negatively. However, if the adjustment of investors’ beliefs are largely counterbalanced, 
one could not observe significant price change. As a result, trading volume analysis 
captures more of the value of this piece of information but price change analysis cannot. 
                                            
15 The following discussion on price and trading volume reaction builds on the literature. 
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Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) provide a view that new information has both 
informedness and consensus effects. Informedness effect captures the extent to which the 
investors receive new useful information, and consensus effect captures the extent to 
which the investors agree with each other at the time of information release. Both price 
change and trading volume change are affected by the direction of changes in 
informedness effect and consensus effect. Therefore, it is not surprising that previous 
research has documented differences between price and trading volume reactions to 
earnings announcement, 10-Ks, and 20-Fs. 
Since the hypothesis in this study is concerned with the magnitude (rather than the 
direction) of market reaction to the release of the 20-F, my measure of price response 
should ignore the sign of the returns in the test windows. Following Doyle and Magilke 
(2013), I use the absolute value in my price measure. I develop the following two 
measures of market response to evaluate the impact of the filing of form 20-F, which I 
then evaluate over the trading windows specified above. 
My first measure is commonly used cumulated abnormal return (CAR), following 
Doyle and Magilke (2013). I calculate abnormal return using the market model below: 
RETj,t =αj +βj×RETm,t + εj,t ,                                                  
where RET is the daily raw return of the firm; RETm is the return on the equally weighted 
U.S. market index; and subscripts j and t refer to firm and day, where t=0 is set as the  
20-F release day. The coefficients !j and "j are the parameter estimates using the OLS 
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during the estimation period (from day -260 to day -1116). The abnormal return for the jth 
firm on day t is as follows: 
                                           ARj,t = RETj,t − (!j + "j * RETm,t).                                        
I then construct cumulative abnormal return for each 20-F filing date by cumulating 
the daily abnormal return using various test windows (0, +2), (0, +3), (0, +4), (-1, +2), (-1, 
+3), and (-1, +4), computed as follows: 
#$%(',			*) = $%-*-.'  
 where m is the starting day of the trading windows, and n is the ending day. 
My second measure is the abnormal trading volume (AVOL) measure developed in 
Asthana and Balsam (2001). I calculate abnormal volume using the following formula: 																																																			$/01 = 23456 2347(234) ,                                                                      
where VOL is the daily trading volume, measured in shares, and µ and σ are the mean 
and standard deviation, respectively, during the non-filing period, which I follow Asthana 
and Balsam (2001) and define as window (-49, -5).  
 
4.3 Matching method 
The purpose of this study is to find that the market reaction pattern is significantly 
different between firms that shortened their reporting lag (hereafter, “acceleration firms”) 
and firms that did not shorten their 20-F reporting lag (hereafter, “non-acceleration 
                                            
16 I require that only firms with at least 30 days of stock return data prior to the event date are included in       
this test. 
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firms”). I also control for other factors that could have affected the market reaction to 
ensure that the difference is solely attributable to the acceleration of reporting lag. 
Therefore, in this study, I follow Doyle and Magilke (2013) and employ a one-to-one 
matching design to generate the control group for comparison purpose. I first identify all 
the acceleration firms, and then match each one of these firms, based on industry, size, 
and year, to a non-acceleration firms, generating a set of non-acceleration firm sample 
which contains the same amount of firms as is in the treatment sample (i.e. the 
acceleration firms sample). If the best matching firm’s size is larger than twice the size of 
the acceleration firms, or smaller than half of the acceleration firm, I delete this pair of 
matching. Comparing the market reaction patterns between the two samples allows me to 
draw conclusions on whether shortening the 20-F reporting lag actually cause different 
market reactions between the two groups. 
 
4.4 Difference-in-differences method 
In order to examine the consequences of accelerating the 20-F filing deadline, I 
employ a difference-in-differences method to test whether accounting quality, reporting 
quality, and readability are significantly different between the treatment and matched 
sample firms in the pre- and post-acceleration periods. For both groups, I first calculate 
the within-group difference of market reactions in the pre- and post-acceleration periods, 
and then compare the difference between the above two within-group differences. This 
difference-in-differences allows me to access whether shortening the 20-F reporting lag 
causes significant different reporting quality change. 
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4.5 Empirical models and control variables 
H1 predicts that market reaction magnitude is larger after the firms shorten their   
20-F reporting lags. I develop two empirical models to test this hypothesis. 
Following Qi et al. (2000), Griffin (2003), and Christensen et al. (2013), I first 
conduct a level analysis on firms’ market reaction. I investigate whether, among all the 
other control variables that might cause differences of market reaction, shortening the  
20-F reporting lag would also drive the difference in the magnitude of market reactions. 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
MKT  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability  
+ α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB + α9×Accruals  
+ α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry  
+Σ year +ε. 
 
In the above model, MKT is the proxy for the magnitude of market reaction. It is 
measured by either the absolute value of CAR or AVOL. SHORTEN is the main 
independent variable that this study focuses on. SHORTEN takes the value of one if the 
firm is in the acceleration group, and zero if the firm is in the matched non-acceleration 
group; Reconcil indicates whether a firm provides the reconciliation from other GAAPs 
to U.S. GAAP. It takes the value of one if the firm provides reconciliation item, and zero 
otherwise. Since Olibe (2001), Chen and Sami (2008, 2013), and Byard et al. (2011) find 
that the reconciliation disclosure is informative for investors, I expect to find larger 
magnitude of market reaction around 20-F release for firms that provide reconciliation 
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items. Assets is controlling for firm size, and is calculated as the logged total assets at the 
year-end. Atiase (1985), Bamber (1987), and Freeman (1987) find that compared to large 
firms’ announcements, smaller firms are less likely to have information available from 
alternative sources, and thus small firms’ announcements convey more unexpected 
information and are associated with larger magnitude of market reaction. Therefore, I 
control for firm size to exclude the possibility that the results are purely driven by firm 
size. Readability indicates for the readability of the 20-F. I control for Readability 
because Brochet et al. (2012) and Lundholm et al. (2014) find that the readability of     
20-Fs affects the market reaction to the financial reports by the FPIs. Following previous 
research (e.g. Li, 2008; Lehavy et al., 2011), Readability is measured using the traditional 
FOG Index method: 
FOG = (words per sentence + percent of complex words) * 0.4 
A complex word is defined as one with three or more syllables. A FOG larger or equal to 
18 indicates that the text is unreadable; a FOG between 14 and 18 means the text is 
difficult to comprehend; a FOG between 12 and 14 is the ideal readability; a FOG 
between 10 and 12 is acceptable; and a FOG between 8 and 10 means the reporting 
language is childish. In other words, FOG is negatively related to readability. 
HomeReport indicates whether the firm has released an annual report in its home country 
before the firm releases the 20-F. By the SEC regulation, if a firm releases its annual 
report in its home country, the English version of the same report should be furnished to 
the SEC promptly as Form 6-K after the home country report release. In most of the cases, 
the main differences between the home country annual report and 20-F are: (1) if any, the 
numbers reported under different GAAPs; and (2) the additional disclosure required by 
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the SEC but not by the home country security exchange supervising body. In other words, 
the home country reports cover most of the important information pertaining to the firm 
performance and corporate governance, except for reconciliation items and additional 
disclosure only required by the US SEC. Therefore, if a firm has released a home country 
report before the 20-F, most of the information has already been traded on around the 
home country report release date (i.e. 6-K release date), and the market reaction will be 
much lower around the 20-F release date, compared to firms without home country 
reports17 before the 20-F release. HomeReport takes the value of one if the firm has 
released its home country report before the 20-F release, and zero otherwise. Therefore, 
HomeReport is expected to be negatively associated with MKT. To control for firm risk, 
the conservatism of the accounting system, and the effect of future growth opportunity, I 
include Leverage as the ratio of total liability to total assets, and MTB as the market-to-
book value, calculated as the ratio of market value to book value (Asthana et al., 2004). 
Following Doyle and Magilke (2013), I also include the following variables to control for 
firm financial performance factors: Accrual indicates total accruals, and is measured as 
income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows, scaled by average total 
assets (Hribar and Collins, 2002); AuditFee indicates the total audit fees, and is measured 
as total audit fees scaled by average total assets. Because the above two items are 
normally not disclosed at earnings announcements, but are first disclosed in 20-Fs, 
investors are likely to react to this new information, causing change in the market 
                                            
17 About 20% of the sample firms have the home country annual reports before the 20-F filing. The rest of 
the sample firms either have their home country annual reports after the 20-F filing, or have no listing in 
their home countries. It is common that a foreign firm only list in the United States but nowhere else. For 
example, in China, a firm must incur at least three years of net income to be eligible to be listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Such a harsh requirement drove most of the 
Chinese firms to seek listing outside the Mainland China stock markets. 
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reaction. SpecialItems indicates special items in the income statement, and is calculated 
as special items scaled by the average total assets. ROA indicates the profitability of 
current fiscal year, and is calculated as net income scaled by the average total assets. 
Sales indicates the firm performance, and is calculated as total revenue scaled by the 
prior year’s revenue. I also include control variables for industries and years, as is regular 
practice in most accounting research. 
One drawback of the level analysis is the concern about potentially omitted firm-
level control variables. Following Doyle and Magilke (2013), I also employ a change 
analysis to investigate whether there is a difference in market reaction change between 
the treatment and matched (i.e. non-acceleration) sample. In the change analysis, I 
compute firm-level differences in the absolute value of the market reaction for each firm 
between the year of acceleration and the year before for both the treatment and the 
matched sample. Using the within-firm differences allows me to use each firm as its own 
control, and to mitigate concerns about potentially omitted firm-level variables. The 
model is specified as follows: 
 
ΔMKT  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccrual + α5×ΔAuditFee  
+ α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA + α9×ΔSales  
+ α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε          
                                                         
In this model, the new variables are defined as follows: ΔMKT is the difference 
between current year MKT and previous year MKT for both the acceleration firms and the 
matched non-acceleration firms, with MKT equal the absolute value of either CAR or 
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AVOL. LoseReconcil indicates whether a firm stopped disclosing the IFRS-U.S. GAAP 
reconciliation in compliance with SEC regulation (SEC, 2007). Since Chen and Sami 
(2008, 2013) find that the IFRS to U.S. GAAP reconciliation disclosure is informative for 
investors, elimination of this reconciliation might cause information loss and result in a 
reduction in the magnitude of the market reaction; ΔAccrual is the change in Accrual; 
ΔAuditFee is the change in AuditFee; ΔAssets is the change in Assets; ΔSpecialItems is 
the change in SpecialItems; ΔROA is the change in ROA; ΔSales is the change in Sales. 
ΔReadability is the change in Readability. All differences are then winsorized at the 
bottom 1% and top 99% level to minimize the influence of extreme observations.  
HomeReport1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a firm released 
a home annual report before 20-F release in the previous year but not in the current year, 
and zero otherwise; HomeReport2 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a 
firm released a home annual report before 20-F release in the current year but not in the 
previous year, and zero otherwise; The reason I create these two control variables to 
control for home country report effect is that, while most companies are consistent with 
their routine of releasing home country report before 20-F release (i.e. either consistently 
no home country report, or consistently releasing home country report), some firms 
release home country annual reports before releasing 20-F in either the current year or the 
previous year, but no such case in the other year. With the discussion on the control 
variable HomeReport in the level analysis model, if HomeReport1 is 1, the MKT in the 
previous year will be smaller, while the MKT in the current year is the same, causing 
ΔMKT to be larger; if HomeReport2 is 1, the MKT in the previous year will be the same, 
while the MKT in the current year will be smaller, causing ΔMKT to be smaller. 
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Therefore, HomeReport1 is expected to be positively associated with ΔMKT, and 
HomeReport2 is expected to be negatively associated with ΔMKT. As usual, year effect is 
also controlled in this model. Because I match firms by industry, using within-firm 
differences, I do not have to control for industry in this change analysis model. 
To test H2, I construct three binary variables to capture the effect of filing deadline 
acceleration on firms with different sizes, i.e. small firms (Small), medium firms 
(Medium), and large firms (Large), using the medium firms as the comparison basis. I 
add two of the three binary variables (to avoid multicollinearity problem) in the two 
models that test H1, and also include three interaction items SHORTEN*Small, 
SHORTEN*Medium, and SHORTEN*Large to test whether the slope of SHORTEN will 
changes depending on firm size. The models to test H2 are as follows:  
 
MKT  = α1 + α2×Small + α3×Large + α4×SHORTEN*Small + α5×SHORTEN*Medium 
+ α6×SHORTEN*Large +α7×Reconcil + α8×Assets + α9×Readability  
+ α10×HomeReport + α11×Leverage + α12×MTB + α13×Accruals  
+ α14×AuditFee + α15×ROA+ α16×Sales + α17×SpecialItems + Σ industry  
+Σ year +ε. 
 
ΔMKT  =α1 + α2×Small + α3×Large + α4×SHORTEN*Small + α5×SHORTEN*Medium 
+ α6×SHORTEN*Large  + α7×LoseReconcil + α8×ΔAccrual + α9×ΔAuditFee  
+ α10×ΔAssets + α11×ΔSpecialItems + α12×ΔROA + α13×ΔSales  
+ α14×ΔReadability +α15×HomeReport1 + α16×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε        
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where Large takes the value of one for the large firms, and zero otherwise; Medium takes 
the value of one for the medium firms, and zero otherwise; Small takes the value of one 
for the small firms, and zero otherwise.  
To test H3, I perform a difference-in-differences analysis on the likelihood of a 
restatement, the likelihood of issuing a 20-F/A, and the 20-F readability. 
In the next chapter, I discuss the sample selection criteria and data items used for the 
empirical study, and report the results from the empirical study. 
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CHAPTER 5                                                                                   
RESULTS 
5.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The sample period covers 2008-2011 because the SEC required all the FPIs to 
follow the new four month filing deadline starting from the fiscal year ending on or after 
December 15, 2008. The SEC also provided a transition period of three years, which 
allowed FPIs to comply with this new rule effective for the fiscal year ending on or after 
December 15, 2011.  
I obtained 20-Fs, 20-F/As, 6-Ks, 20-F file size, and 20-F filing dates from EDGAR; 
daily trading volume, stock returns, and index data from CRSP; firm financial data from 
COMPUSTAT; and firm major operation country 18 , U.S. filer status, audit fees, 
accounting standards, and restatement data from Audit Analytics.  
Sample firms were initially obtained from the SEC’s official annual summary of 
“International Registered and Reporting Companies”.19 This study focuses on the FPIs 
listed on either the NASDAQ or the NYSE because these firms are subject to the new 20-
F filing deadline requirement. As a result, I excluded Canadian firms20, over-the-counter 
firms21, and debt issuing firms in the SEC official FPI list, and identified 454 firms that 
had filed 20-Fs during the test period. To be classified as an acceleration firm, the 
                                            
18 Many FPIs are registered in tax-free areas such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and Marshall Islands, but 
have their major business and operation in a specific country. However, several firms are registered in 
such area but have similarly-weighted operations in several countries. In this situation, I identify these 
firms’ main operation country as the registration country.  
19 For more information, visit https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml. 
20 Due to the similarity between U.S. firms and Canadian firms, and the special filing requirements for 
Canadian firms, I excluded Canadian firms from my final sample. 
21 Over-the-counter firms are not required to file Form 20-F. However, many firms do voluntarily file this 
form, but the SEC has no requirement on their 20-F filing deadline. 
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reporting lag for a firm should reduce by at least 20 days22. I also deleted firms with 
increased reporting lags for at least 20 days, unusual patterns of reporting lag change (e.g. 
reporting lags are 4, 6, and 4 months after the year-end in three consecutive years, 
respectively), and firms that filed Form NT 20-F23. Table 1 Panel A shows that 230 and 
855 firm years are classified as the acceleration and non-acceleration firms, respectively. 
Non-acceleration firms are firms with their 20-F reporting lag change by less than 20 
days.  
Panel B shows the sample selection procedure. For the acceleration firms, only 187 
firm-years (out of 230 firm years) have market and accounting data available. Around 
half of these firms early adopted the new deadline policy in 2008, 2009, and 2010, while 
the rest of the firms complied with the new deadline in 2011. After matching24 the 
acceleration firms with the non-acceleration firms by industry, firm size, and year, I 
obtained 187 pairs of firm-years25 that are used for the main empirical tests in this study, 
as shown in Panel C.  
Panel D shows the geographic distribution of the 187 acceleration firms. It shows 
that 50 firms (29.41%) are from China, 21 firms (11.23%) are from Israel, 13 firms 
(6.95%) are from Greece, 13 firms (6.95%) are from Mexico, 10 firms (5.35%) are from 
                                            
22 Although arbitrary, the 20 day threshold seems reasonable because many firms do not wait until the end 
of the month to file their 20-Fs. For example, a firm may accelerate its filing date from May 20th to April 
30th to comply with the new policy. It is reasonable to consider this firm as an acceleration firm. 
23 Form NT 20-F is the “Notice under Rule 12b25 of inability to timely file all or part of an annual report of 
Form 20-F”. Firms that are not able to timely file 20-F should file the NT 20-F by the 20-F deadline, and 
SEC allows only 15 extra days for firms to submit the 20-F. 
24 The underlying logic for matching acceleration firms to non-acceleration firms is explained in the 
research design section. 
25 A firm can be classified as “acceleration firm” in multiple years. For example, if the reporting lag for a 
firm is 6, 4, and 3 months in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively, it is classified as “acceleration firm” in 
both 2009 and 2010. Therefore, instead of “single firms”, the objects of interest in the final sample are 
“firm-years”. 
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Chile, and the rest of 65 firms (52.21%) are from other countries.  It is not surprising to 
see a large number of Chinese firms in the sample, because Chinese domestic capital 
market has very strict requirements for the initial listing. As a result, the U.S. capital 
markets have become one of the most popular places for Chinese companies to raise 
capital overseas. In fact, most of the Chinese firms (47 firms, 85.45%) in the sample are 
solely listed in the U.S. capital markets.        
[Insert Table 1] 
        Table 2 Panel A provides all types of reporting lag accelerations. 100 out of 187 
firms (53.48%) with their reporting lags shortened from six months to four months, and 
36 firms (19.25%) with their reporting lags shortened from five months to four months. 
In total, 136  firms (72.73%) are regarded as the standard acceleration firm sample that is 
the main sample of this study. Moreover, 23 firms (12.30%) with their reporting lags 
shortened from more than four months to less than four months. The rest 28 firms 
(14.97%) originally had reporting lags of four months or less before the SEC 2008 
regulation came into effect. These firms further shortened their reporting lags by at least 
20 days. In total, there are 51 firms that voluntarily shortened their reporting lags to less 
than four months after the fiscal year end. Table 2 Panel B shows that 100 firms (53.48%) 
shortened their reporting lags in 2011, while the remaining 87 firms (46.52%) voluntarily 
shortened their reporting lags before 2011. Panel C classifies the acceleration firms by the 
firm size. It shows that 84 out of 187 firms (45%) are large firms, 64 firms (34%) are 
medium firms, and only 39 firms (21%) are small firms. Overall, it appears that the 
majority of the acceleration firms are larger firms.  
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[Insert Table 2] 
        Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables from the standard acceleration 
sample. Firms in this sample complied with the SEC 2008 regulation to the minimum, 
with their new reporting lags being four months. Panel A shows that 48 firms (35.29%) 
are from China, 12 firms (8.82%) are from Israel, 11 firms (8.09%) are from Mexico, and 
the rest of 65 firms (52.21%) are from other countries. Panel B classifies the standard 
acceleration firms by firm size. It shows that 61 firms (45%) are large firms, 45 firms 
(33%) are medium firms, and only 30 firms (222%) are small firms. Overall, it appears 
that the majority of the standard acceleration firms are larger firms, consistent with the 
full sample. Therefore, it can be inferred that the majority of the voluntary acceleration 
firms are also large firms, who do not normally procrastinate with the 20-F filing in order 
to reduce the unfavorable effects of moral hazard (Scott, 1997) or avoid adverse selection 
(Grossman, 1981).  
[Insert Table 3] 
5.2 Empirical Results 
5.2.1 Market reaction to 20-F releases  
Table 4 reports the results from the multivariate analysis for the standard 
acceleration sample. The variable of interest is SHORTEN, which equals one if the firm is 
classified as an acceleration firm and zero if the firm is a matched non-acceleration firm. 
The slope coefficient on SHORTEN indicates the difference in market reaction to 20-F 
releases between the acceleration firms and the matched non-acceleration firms. If the 
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acceleration of 20-F reporting lag results in an increase (decrease) in market reaction, the 
coefficient on SHORTEN should be significantly positive (negative). I also include other 
control variables, as described in Chapter 4, to the regression model in an attempt to 
control any possible changes in the information environment from the pre-acceleration to 
the acceleration year that might affect the change in market reactions. 
[Insert Table 4] 
        Panel A of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
abnormal return analysis. Only 13.97% firms provide the reconciliation disclosure from 
domestic GAAP to U.S. GAAP, and the rest are not required to provide such 
reconciliation disclosure. The average FOG Index of 20-Fs is 11.78, indicating that 20-Fs 
are generally easy to read. The mean of HomeReport is 0.2547, suggesting that about a 
quarter of the firms released their home country annual reports before their 20-F releases. 
The average debt to asset ratio is 48.48%, the average MTB is 1.29, and the average ROA 
is 8.16% for the entire sample.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the multivariate regression results from the abnormal 
return (CAR) analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are consistently positive and 
significant for all the event windows (0, +2), (0, +3), (0, +4), (-1, +2), (-1, +3), and (-1, 
+4), indicating that the acceleration firms have significantly larger magnitude of 
abnormal returns around 20-F releases relative to non-acceleration firms. Among the 
control variables, SpecialItems and AuditFee are significant in all the event windows, 
which is consistent with the prediction that these items are for the first time released in 
20-Fs. HomeReport is negatively significant in both (0, +3) and (0, +4) windows, which 
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is consistent with the prediction that the magnitude of market reaction around 20-F 
releases is weaker if annual reports were previously released in the home markets and 
filed in the 6-K before 20-F releases. These results suggest that investors find shortened 
reporting lag of 20-Fs to be more timely and useful for their investment decision making. 
Panel C of Table 4 presents the multivariate regression results from the abnormal 
trading volume (AVOL) analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are not significant for 
any event windows, indicating that more timely 20-Fs may not affect investors’ trading 
activities. However, I find some evidence that the readability of 20-Fs and firm growth 
opportunity (MTB) are positively associated with abnormal trading volume. 
Panel D of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
change in abnormal return (ΔCAR) analysis. While the means of ΔCAR vary in sign, the 
means of ΔAVOL are consistently positive, suggesting that investors may have considered 
the information contained in 20-Fs when trading. 5.88% of the sample firms stopped 
providing the reconciliation disclosure, which could be caused by the fact that more firms 
had switched to IFRS during the test period. Average 20-F readability reduced by 0.36, 
while the median change in readability is 0, suggesting that the readability of 20-Fs did 
not significantly change after the reporting lag of 20-Fs was shortened. 3.31% of the 
sample firms had filed their home country annual reports before 20-F releases in the 
previous year but not in the current year, and 2.94% of the sample firms had filed their 
home country annual reports before 20-F releases in the current year but not in the 
previous year. 
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Panel E of Table 4 presents the multivariate regression results from the change in 
abnormal return (ΔCAR) analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are significantly 
positive for the event windows (0, +3), (0, +4), (-1, +2), (-1, +3), and (-1, +4), indicating 
that the acceleration firms have a significantly larger change in abnormal returns around 
20-F releases relative to the non-acceleration firms. Among the control variables, 
LoseReconcil and ΔReadability are negatively significant in some event windows. This is 
consistent with the prediction that when a firm stops providing reconciliation disclosure, 
or if a firm’s 20-F is less readable, the magnitude of change in abnormal returns should 
be smaller. Overall, the results are consistent with the results in the level analysis as 
shown in Panel B, suggesting that the investors find timely 20-Fs to be more useful as a 
result of shortened reporting lag of 20-Fs. 
Panel F of Table 4 presents the multivariate regression results from the change in 
abnormal volume (ΔAVOL) analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are positively 
significant for the event windows (-1, +3), and (-1, +4) using one-tailed test, indicating 
that the acceleration firms experience a significant change in abnormal trading volumes 
around 20-F releases relative to the non-acceleration firms. This means that the more 
timely 20-Fs allow investors to reflect the information contained in 20-Fs into their 
trading activities. 
Taken together, the results from the above multivariate analyses show that the 
standard acceleration firms experience a significantly larger magnitude of market reaction 
to 20-F releases. I also find that results using abnormal returns are much stronger than 
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results using trading volumes. Overall, investors appear to reward the more timely 20-Fs, 
as they provide more relevant information for investors’ decision making. 
[Insert Table 5] 
5.2.2 Firm size effect on market reaction to 20-F releases 
Table 5 presents the empirical results pertaining to H2, which predicts that larger 
firms may benefit more from the acceleration of 20-F filing deadline than smaller firms. 
In other words, I predict that the slope coefficient on SHORTEN*Small to be smaller than 
the slope coefficients on SHORTEN*Medium and SHORTEN*large.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
abnormal return analysis. 22% of the 272 firms are small firms, 33% are medium and 45% 
are large firms. The descriptive statistics of other variables are consistent with those as 
shown in panel A of Table 4. Panel B presents the multivariate regression results after 
considering the firm size effect. The SEC considers both medium and large firms as the 
accelerated filers as compared to smaller non-accelerated filers. The coefficients on 
SHORTEN*large are significantly positive for the event windows (0, +2), (0, +3), (0, +4), 
(-1, +2), and (-1, +4), and the coefficients on SHORTEN*Medium are also significantly 
positive for all the event windows. The coefficients on SHORTEN*Small, however, are 
never significant, indicating that larger firms experience a significantly larger abnormal 
return around 20-F releases than smaller firms. In other words, I find evidence that larger 
firms benefit more from the acceleration of 20-F filing deadline than smaller firms. 
Among the control variables, SpecialItems and AuditFee are again significant in all the 
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event windows. Panel C of Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results from the 
abnormal trading volume analysis. The adjusted R2s of all the models are negative, 
meaning that these models are somehow mis-specified.  
Panel D of Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
change in abnormal return analysis. Again, 22% of the 272 firms are small firms, 33% are 
medium and 45% are large firms. Other variables are the same as shown in Panel D of 
Table 4. Panel E of Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results from the change 
in abnormal return analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN*Medium are significantly 
positive for the event windows (0, +3) and (-1, +3), and the coefficients on 
SHORTEN*Large are significantly positive for all the event windows. The coefficients 
on SHORTEN*Small are, however, never significant, indicating that larger firms have a 
significantly larger change in abnormal returns around 20-F releases relative to smaller 
firms after the filing deadline of 20-Fs was shortened. The results in the change analysis 
are generally consistent with the results in the level analysis as shown in Panel B, 
suggesting that larger firms benefit more from the acceleration of 20-F filing deadline 
than smaller firms.  
Panel F of Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results from the change in 
abnormal volume analysis. The coefficient on SHORTEN*Small is significantly positive 
only for the event window (-1, +4). The adjusted R2s of the other models are consistently 
negative, meaning that these models are somehow mis-specified. Taken together, the 
above multivariate analyses show that large and medium standard acceleration firms 
experience significantly larger abnormal returns around 20-F releases after the filing 
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deadline of 20-Fs was shortened. I also find consistent evidence using abnormal trading 
volumes.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the results pertaining to H3, which examines the extent to which 
the acceleration of 20-F filing deadline affects subsequent accounting and financial report 
quality. More specifically, I examine whether the shortened 20-F filing deadline increases 
the possibility of issuing restatements and 20-F/As, and reduce the readability of 20-Fs. 
Table 6 Panel A shows a fairly large increase of 3.68% (t-statistic=2.27) in the likelihood 
of issuing restatements from the acceleration firms following the shortened reporting lag, 
relative to a decrease of 0.74% (t-statistic=1.00) from the matched firms. The difference 
of the change in the likelihood of issuing restatements is significant at the 5% level (t-
statistic=2.48), indicating that the accelerated firms are more likely to issue restatements 
after the filing deadline of 20-Fs was shortened. Panel B shows an insignificant increase 
of 5.15% (t-statistic=1.07) in the likelihood of filing 20-F/As from the acceleration firms, 
relative to a significant increase of 12.50% (t-statistic=2.46) from the matched firms. The 
difference in the increase in the likelihood of filing 20-F/As is insignificant (t-
statistic=1.05), indicating that the accelerated firms are not more likely to file 20-F/As 
after these firms shortened their 20-Fs filing deadline. Finally, Panel C shows that the 
acceleration firms significantly decreased their 20-F readability (t-statistic=-1.89), while 
the readability of the matched firms’ 20-Fs did not change significantly (t-statistic=-1.07). 
The difference of the change in 20-Fs readability appears to be insignificant (t-statistic =-
0.60). The above three tests provide evidence that restatements appear to increase 
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following the shortened reporting lag of 20-Fs, but the 20-F amendments and readability 
of 20-Fs do not appear to have been affected. 
[Insert Table 7] 
To test whether firm size also affects the accounting quality and reporting quality 
change after firms accelerated their filing deadline, I also perform a difference-in-
differences test using three subsamples, i.e. the small, medium, and large firm samples. 
Table 7 presents the analysis of change in the likelihood of issuing restatements. Panel A 
shows that for large firms there is no difference in the change in the likelihood of issuing 
restatements between the treatment and matched firms. Panel B shows that, for medium 
firms, there is a fairly large increase in the likelihood (6.67%, t =1.77) of issuing 
restatements from the acceleration firms. The difference in the change in the likelihood of 
issuing restatements is significant at the 10% level (t-statistic=1.77), indicating that 
medium accelerated firms are more likely to issue restatements compared to the non-
accelerated firms. I do not find such a difference in small firms in Panel C. The above 
findings suggest that the acceleration of filing deadline only affects the likelihood of 
restatements for medium firms. However, since this finding is only based on six firms (6 
versus 136 firms), the results need to be interpreted with caution.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 8 presents the analysis of the likelihood of issuing 20-F amendments after the 
acceleration of filing deadline. Panel A shows that there is no difference in the change in 
the likelihood of issuing 20-F/As between the treatment and matched firms. Panel B 
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shows that, for medium firms, there is a fairly large increase of the likelihood (24.44%, t 
= 2.66) of issuing 20-F/As for the matched firms. The difference in the change in the 
likelihood of issuing 20-F/As is, however, insignificant (t-statistic=1.22), indicating that 
accelerating the filing deadline does not cause a significant difference in the likelihood of 
issuing 20-F/As. Panel C shows similar results for the small firms sample. Taken together, 
the above results show that accelerating the filing deadline does not increase the 
likelihood of issuing 20-F/As across different sizes of firms. 
Table 9 presents the analysis of change in readability due to the acceleration of 20-F 
filing deadline. Consistent with 20-F/As, I find that accelerating the filing deadline does 
not cause a significant change in the readability of 20-Fs across different sizes of firms. 
[Insert Table 9] 
5.3 Additional tests 
5.3.1 Is further accelerated reporting lag of 20-Fs beneficial? 
There are 23 firms that accelerated their reporting lag from more than four months to 
less than four months, which is defined as the Voluntary 1 firms, and 28 firms that 
accelerated their reporting lag from four months or three months to less, which is defined 
as the Voluntary 2 firms. This section examines whether the 20-F filing deadline should 
be further accelerated to three months or less to align with the 10-K filing deadlines. 
Advocates argue that since FPIs are listed in the U.S. and under the U.S. rules, they 
should comply with the same SEC rules as their U.S. counterparts do. However, the 
opponents argue that FPIs fundamentally differ from domestic U.S. firms because these 
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firms are from countries with reporting, legal systems and levels of investor protection 
different from the U.S. This debate raises an important issue as to whether the proposed 
four-month filing deadline is “optimal” for FPIs and whether a further shortened 20-Fs 
deadline will provide investors more timely and useful information for their decision-
making. The following tests examine this issue.  
[Insert Table 10] 
Table 10 presents the multivariate regression results for firms in the Voluntary 1 
acceleration sample. Panel A of Table 10 shows that these firms are different from those 
standard acceleration firms in terms of firm size, leverage, MTB, and ROA. The 
Voluntary 1 acceleration firms appear to be smaller in size, leverage, and MTB, and 
larger in ROA. The abnormal return analysis in Panel B shows that the coefficients on 
SHORTEN is positive and marginally significant using the event window (-1, +4). This 
suggests that there is a marginal net benefit from further accelerating the filing deadline 
to less than four months for firms that used to file their 20-Fs six or five months after 
fiscal year end. However, I do not find consistent evidence when using abnormal trading 
volume, change in abnormal return, and change in abnormal volume analyses. This 
finding, therefore, needs to be interpreted with caution. 
[Insert Table 11] 
Table 11 presents the results for firms in the Voluntary 2 acceleration sample. Panel 
A of Table 11 shows that these firms are different from those standard acceleration firms 
in terms of firm size, leverage, MTB, and ROA. The Voluntary 2 acceleration firms 
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appear to be larger in size, leverage, and ROA, and smaller in MTB. However, I do not 
find any significant coefficients on SHORTEN with the predicted sign when using the 
abnormal return, abnormal trading volume, change in abnormal return, and change in 
trading volume analyses. This suggests that there is no significant net benefit from further 
accelerating the filing deadline to less than four months when these firms already filed 
their 20-Fs four months after fiscal year end before the new rule. Again, this finding 
needs to be interpreted with caution because of the small sample size. Further study 
should revisit this issue when more data become available. 
[Insert Table 12] 
5.3.2 Do Chinese firms dominate the empirical results? 
Since Chinese firms account for more than one third (35.29%) of the standard 
acceleration sample, I divide the sample into the Chinese and non-Chinese subsamples to 
further investigate whether the main results as reported in Table 4 are driven by the 
Chinese firms. Table 12 presents the main test results only using the Chinese subsample. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the abnormal return 
analysis. The Chinese firms are different from those standard acceleration firms in terms 
of firm size, leverage, percentage of home country report, and ROA. The Chinese firms 
appear to be smaller in size, leverage, and percentage of home country report, and larger 
in ROA. Panel B presents the multivariate regression results from the abnormal return 
analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are significantly positive for all the event 
windows (0, +2), (0, +3), (0, +4), (-1, +2), (-1, +3), and (-1, +4). Panel C presents the 
multivariate regression results from the abnormal trading volume analysis. I find that 
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only the coefficient on SHORTEN in the event window (0, +4) is marginally significant 
with the predicted sign, but the adjusted R2s of all the models are negative, meaning that 
these models are somehow mis-specified. Panel D presents the descriptive statistics of 
variables used for change in abnormal return and abnormal trading volume analyses. The 
means of ΔCAR are consistently negative in all the test windows, while the means of 
ΔAVOL are consistently positive. 1.04% of the firms stopped providing domestic GAAP-
U.S. GAAP reconciliation disclosure, slightly lower than the full standard acceleration 
sample. Average readability reduces by 0.21, while the median readability change is 0. 
Again, the readability of 20-Fs does not appear to have changed much after 20-F 
reporting lag was shortened. 2.08% of Chinese firms had released their home country 
annual reports in the 6-K before 20-F releases in the previous year but not in the current 
year, and 2.08% of firms had released their home country annual reports in the 6-K 
before 20-F releases in the current year but not in the previous year. Panel E presents the 
multivariate regression results from the change in abnormal return analysis. The 
coefficient on SHORTEN is significantly positive at the 10% level only for the event 
windows (0, +4). Panel F presents the multivariate regression results from the change in 
abnormal volume analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are significantly positive only 
for the event windows (0, +4) and (-1, +4). 
Taken together, the results for the Chinese firms subsample are generally consistent 
with those for the main sample in the abnormal return, abnormal trading volume and 
change in abnormal volume analyses. However, I find that the results using change in 
abnormal returns are much weaker for the Chinese firms.    
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[Insert Table 13] 
Table 13 presents the results for the non-Chinese subsample. Panel A presents the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the abnormal return analysis. The non-
Chinese firms are different from the Chinese firms in terms of firm size, leverage, MTB, 
percentage of home country report, and ROA. The non-Chinese firms appear to be larger 
in size, leverage, MTB, and percentage of home country report, and smaller in ROA. 
Panel B presents the multivariate regression results from the abnormal return analysis. 
The coefficients on SHORTEN are never significant for any event windows, indicating 
that non-Chinese acceleration firms do not experience any abnormal returns around 20-F 
releases. This finding, however, is very different from the finding for the Chinese firms 
as reported in Panel B of Table 12. Panel C presents the multivariate regression results 
using abnormal trading volumes. The coefficients on SHORTEN are again never 
significant for any event windows, indicating that non-Chinese acceleration firms do not 
experience any abnormal trading volumes around 20-F releases relative to the non-
acceleration firms. Panel D presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
change in abnormal return and abnormal trading volume analyses. The means of ΔCAR 
are consistently positive in all the test windows, while the means ΔAVOL vary by sign. 
8.52% of the non-Chinese firms stopped providing domestic GAAP-U.S. GAAP 
reconciliation disclosure, higher than the Chinese firms. Average readability reduces by 
0.45, while the median readability change is 0. Consistent with our previous findings, the 
readability of 20-Fs did not appear to have changed after the filing deadline of 20-Fs was 
shortened. 3.98% firms had released their home country annual reports in the 6-K before 
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20-F releases in the previous year but not in the current year, and 3.41% of firms had 
released their home country annual reports in the 6-K before 20-F releases in the current 
year but not in the previous year. Panel E presents the multivariate regression results 
from the change in abnormal return analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are 
significantly positive for the event windows (0, +3), (0, +4), (-1, +2), (-1, +3), and (-1, 
+4), indicating that non-Chinese acceleration firms experience a larger change in 
abnormal returns around 20-F releases. This finding is rather different from the Chinese 
firms as reported in Panel E of Table 12. Panel F presents the multivariate regression 
results from the change in abnormal volume analysis. The coefficients on SHORTEN are 
never significant for any event windows. 
Taken together, the results for non-Chinese firms are much weaker than those for 
Chinese firms. Moreover, I find that results for non-Chinese firms are consistent with 
those for the main sample in the abnormal trading volume and change in abnormal return 
analyses. 
The next Chapter summarizes the findings in this study and discusses the 
implication from the results. 
 
 
 
 
52 
CHAPTER 6                                                                                   
CONCLUSION 
This study examines the impact of the SEC’s decision to accelerate the 20-F filing 
deadline on the informativeness and reliability of the 20-F. The SEC claims that a 
shortened 20-F filing deadline will provide investors with more timely and relevant 
information for their investment decision-making. However, acceleration of filing 
deadline also shortens the preparation time of financial statements, which could adversely 
affect the quality and accuracy of annual reports and make them less useful for investors.  
I find that firms that accelerate their 20-F filing deadline experience significant 
abnormal returns and increased abnormal returns around 20-F releases, compared to the 
non-acceleration firms. However, I find weaker results when using abnormal trading 
volume and change in abnormal trading volume. I also find that the above results vary by 
firm size. In fact, I find that only large and medium firms experience significant and 
positive abnormal returns around 20-F releases; small firms do not experience any 
significant abnormal returns and trading volumes around 20-F releases. This is partially 
consistent with the findings in Dolye and Magilke (2013) and the notion of 
“diseconomies of scale” that when all firms face the same preparation time cut, larger 
firms have more financial resources and better infrastructure to support the execution of 
shortening the 20-F filing deadline.  
I also examine whether shortening the 20-F filing deadline affects accounting and 
reporting quality. Using the difference-in-differences tests, I find that with less 
preparation time for the 20-Fs, only the medium firms sample shows a significantly 
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higher probability of restating prior financial statements (6.67% higher) compared to 
large and small acceleration firms. Further analysis shows that the readability of 20-Fs 
and the likelihood of issuing amendment following 20-F filing did not change after filing 
acceleration, compared to the matched non-acceleration firms.  
I also perform some additional tests to ensure the robustness of the above findings. 
First, as there are voluntary acceleration firms who shortened their filing deadline to less 
than four months, they provide a good sample to investigate whether further accelerated 
filing deadline is beneficial. The results show that there is little to no net benefit for firms 
to further shorten their filing deadline to less than four month. However, the result needs 
to be interpreted with caution because it is based on a rather small sample (51 voluntary 
firms). Second, because Chinese firms account for more than one third of the sample, I 
further investigate whether the findings of this study are mainly driven by the Chinese 
firms. I find that the results for Chinese and non-Chinese firms are somewhat different. 
Chinese firms experience more significant abnormal returns and change in abnormal 
trading volumes, while non-Chinese firms experience more significant change in trading 
volumes around the 20-F releases in the year when the filing lags of 20-Fs were 
shortened.  
Overall, this study provides empirical evidence to shed light on the consequences of 
shortening the filing deadline of 20-Fs. Shortening the 20-F filing deadline has a 
significant impact on the relevance (informativeness) and reliability of 20-Fs, and the 
new “four-month” filing deadline appears to be appropriate for FPIs. The results should 
be of interest to the SEC, corporate managers, and financial statement preparers. As the 
four-month filing deadline is still one to two months behind the 10-K’s deadlines, 
54 
whether it is beneficial to further accelerate the 20-F filing deadline to align with the 
filing deadlines of U.S. domestic firms is certainly worth investigating. Future research 
could investigate the extent to which accounting quality is affected in the post-
acceleration period, and use more data to determine whether further shortened reporting 
lag is plausible. Moreover, with shortened reporting lag between 10-Ks and 20-Fs, it is 
interesting to investigate the information transfer between the U.S. domestic firms and 
foreign firms that are listed in the US markets, as the literature only examined the 
information transfer either between U.S. domestics firms or between U.S. domestic firms 
and international firms listed in international markets. There is still a big gap in the 
literature about the information transfer between the U.S. domestic firms and foreign 
firms that are listed in the US markets. Moreover, further research should examine how 
financial analysts react to the shortened filing lag of 20-Fs. Finally, future research 
should investigate non-robot investors’ searching behavior through EDGAR following 
the shortened filing lag of 20-Fs. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
Panel A: Number of Observations 
Year Acceleration Non-acceleration 
2008 37 238 
2009 37 220 
2010 32 225 
2011 124 172 
Total 230 855 
 
Panel B: Acceleration Firms Sample Selection Procedure 
230      Original acceleration firms 
-14      No financial data  
-13      No return data 
-16      No match 
187     Firms available for this study 
 
Panel C: Final Sample Composition 
Year Acceleration Matched Total 
2008 31 31 62 
2009 28 28 56 
2010 28 28 56 
2011 100 100 200 
Total 187 187 374 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
This table reports the sample selection procedure. Acceleration firms refer to the firms that shortened their 
20-F reporting lag by at least 20 days. Non-acceleration firms refer to firms that changed their 20-F 
reporting lag by at most 19 days. Each acceleration firm is matched with one non-acceleration firm based 
on market capitalization, filing year, and industry in the acceleration year.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
(Continued) 
Panel D: Number of Observations by Geographic Areas 
Argentina  9 Italy 2   
Australia  1 Japan 2 
Bermuda  5 Korea (South) 8 
Brazil  8 Luxembourg 1 
Chile  10 Mexico 13 
China  55 Monaco 3 
Denmark  1 Netherland 2 
France  2 Panama 1 
Greece  13 Russia 2 
Hong Kong  3 Singapore 1 
India  4 Spain 4 
Indonesia  1 Sweden 1 
Ireland  2 Taiwan (China) 5 
Israel  21 United Kingdom 7 
   Total 187  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of All Acceleration Firms 
Panel A: Type of Acceleration 
Type \ Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Standard 6→4 11 7 12 70 100 
5→4 7 5 6 18 36 
Voluntary 1 
6→3 5 2 2 1 10 
5→3 2 3 1 6 12 
5→2   1     1 
Voluntary 2 
4→3 2 8 4 4 18 
4→2 2  1  3 
3→2 2 1 2 1 6 
3→1   1     1 
  Total 31 28 28 100 187 
 
Panel B: Number of Observations by Acceleration Category 
Type \ Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Standard  18 12 18 88 136 
Voluntary 1 7 6 3 7 23 
Voluntary 2 6 10 7 5 28 
Total 31 28 28 100 187 
 
Panel C: Number of Observations by Filer Status 
Size \ Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total % 
Large 14 11 13 46 84 45% 
Medium 9 11 8 36 64 34% 
Small 8 6 7 18 39 21% 
Total 31 28 28 100 187 100% 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
In Panel A, the notation “m n” refers to the type of change where a firm’s reporting lag in the previous 
year is m months, and in the current year is n months. “Standard” firms refer to those firms that shortened 
their 20-F reporting lag to four months, “Voluntary 1” firms refer to those firms that shortened their 20-F 
reporting lag from more than four months to less than four months. “Voluntary 2” firms refer to those firms 
that shortened their 20-F reporting lag from no more than four months to even less. “Large” firms have 
$700 million public float or more; “Medium” firms have less than $700 million but no less than 75 million 
public float; and “Small” firms have less than 75 million public float. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Standard Acceleration Firms 
Panel A: Number of Observations by Geographic Areas 
Argentina  9 Israel 12 
Australia  1 Italy 2 
Bermuda  4 Korea (South) 8 
Brazil  7 Mexico 11 
Chile  8 Monaco 1 
China  48    Netherland 1 
Denmark  1 Russia 2 
France  1 Singapore 1 
Greece  5 Spain 3 
Hong Kong 2 Taiwan (China) 5 
India  2 United Kingdom 1 
Indonesia   1 Total 136 
 
Panel B: Number of Observations by Filer Status 
Size \ Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total % 
Large 8 4 10 39 61 45% 
Medium 5 5 3 32 45 33% 
Small 5 3 5 17 30 22% 
Total 18 12 18 88 136 100% 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
In Panel B, “Large” firms have $700 million public float or more; “Medium” firms have less than $700 
million but no less than 75 million public float; and “Small” firms have less than 75 million public float. 
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Standard Acceleration Sample 
Panel A: Level Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
CAR(0,+2) 272 0.0009  -0.0013  0.0531  -0.0194  0.0213  
CAR(0,+3) 272 0.0035  -0.0017  0.0586  -0.0239  0.0272  
CAR(0,+4) 272 0.0044  0.0002  0.0634  -0.0233  0.0326  
CAR(-1,+2) 272 0.0035  0.0015  0.0619  -0.0221  0.0269  
CAR(-1,+3) 272 0.0062  0.0001  0.0677  -0.0217  0.0388  
CAR(-1,+4) 272 0.0071  0.0056  0.0726  -0.0222  0.0401  
AVOL(0,+2) 272 0.5675  -0.8186  6.3750  -1.5142  0.8271  
AVOL(0,+3) 272 0.5967  -1.0826  7.0429  -1.9498  0.9822  
AVOL(0,+4) 272 0.5440  -1.3382  7.5363  -2.5962  1.3953  
AVOL(-1,+2) 272 0.5593  -0.9931  6.6398  -1.9128  0.9965  
AVOL(-1,+3) 272 0.5886  -1.1665  7.3446  -2.3175  0.9370  
AVOL(-1,+4) 272 0.5358  -1.4238  7.8523  -2.8431  1.3669  
SHORTEN 272 0.5000  0.5000  0.5009  0.0000  1.0000  
Reconcil 272 0.1397  0.0000  0.3473  0.0000  0.0000  
Assets 272 7.5761  7.0870  2.3253  5.6916  9.4470  
Readability 272 11.7824  11.6000  2.0066  10.8000  12.4000  
HomeReport 272 0.2574  0.0000  0.4380  0.0000  1.0000  
Leverage 272 0.4848  0.4869  0.2579  0.2448  0.6984  
MTB 272 1.2863  0.8415  1.3097  0.4417  1.5934  
Accruals 272 0.0766  0.0604  0.0651  0.0287  0.1015  
AuditFee 272 0.0016  0.0007  0.0022  0.0002  0.0021  
ROA 272 0.0816  0.0564  0.0864  0.0212  0.1059  
Sales 272 0.3434  0.1663  0.7631  0.0611  0.3562  
SpecialItems 272 0.0165  0.0007  0.0470  0.0000  0.0102  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
CAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.0136   0.0034   -0.0390   0.0194   0.0363   -0.0060   SHORTEN 0.0219  *** 0.0217  *** 0.0252  *** 0.0183  ** 0.0180  ** 0.0216  ** 
Reconcil -0.0063   -0.0002   -0.0100   -0.0010   0.0051   -0.0048   Assets -0.0002   0.0006   0.0025   -0.0009   -0.0001   0.0018   Readability 0.0023   0.0019   0.0025   0.0017   0.0013   0.0018   HomeReport -0.0141   -0.0180  * -0.0222  ** -0.0106   -0.0144   -0.0186   Leverage -0.0044   -0.0231   -0.0170   -0.0038   -0.0225   -0.0164   MTB -0.0043   -0.0041   -0.0055  * -0.0022   -0.0021   -0.0034   Accruals -0.0612   -0.0920   -0.1145  * -0.0470   -0.0777   -0.1003   AuditFee -4.4914  ** -5.6631  ** -5.9429  ** -6.0639  ** -7.2358  *** -7.5150  *** 
ROA 0.0361   0.0458   0.0345   0.0122   0.0219   0.0106   Sales -0.0017   -0.0006   0.0003   0.0039   0.0050   0.0059   SpecialItems 0.2469  *** 0.2729  *** 0.3078  *** 0.3298  *** 0.3558  *** 0.3907  *** 
N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.1463  0.1507  0.1708  0.1179  0.1268  0.1358  Adj. R2 0.0708   0.0756   0.0976   0.0399   0.0497   0.0594   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
AVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 4.04411  4.26537  3.66973  4.51382  4.73508  4.13944  SHORTEN 0.15181  0.44577  0.76127  -0.04698  0.24698  0.56248  Reconcil -0.90822  -1.30586  -1.38801  -1.06584  -1.46348  -1.54562  Assets -0.11776  -0.1458  -0.05970  -0.12264  -0.15069  -0.06459  Readability -0.32716  -0.39108 * -0.39800  -0.33684  -0.40076 * -0.40769  HomeReport -0.35863  -0.4422  -0.99899  -0.69330  -0.77687  -1.33365  Leverage 0.78640  0.62757  0.97857  0.94801  0.78918  1.14018  MTB 0.72237 ** 0.60556  0.53322  0.64485 * 0.52804  0.45570  Accruals -3.22255  -4.29829  -5.54527  -4.16572  -5.24145  -6.48843  AuditFee -215.127  -224.727  -246.295  -241.037  -250.636  -272.204  ROA 2.49641  1.61120  0.65241  1.75122  0.86601  -0.09278  Sales -0.20465  -0.28222  -0.22339  -0.24362  -0.32120  -0.26237  SpecialItems -0.07667  0.51048  1.43224  1.13153  1.71868  2.64044  N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.0529  0.0535  0.0562  0.0516  0.0521  0.0555  Adj. R2 -0.0308   -0.0301   -0.0271   -0.0322   -0.0316   -0.0280   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Standard Acceleration Sample 
Panel D: Change Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
ΔCAR(0,+2) 272 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0474 -0.0231 0.0151 
ΔCAR(0,+3) 272 -0.0011 -0.0026 0.0552 -0.0302 0.0220 
ΔCAR(0,+4) 272 -0.0050 -0.0019 0.0575 -0.0336 0.0216 
ΔCAR(-1,+2) 272 0.0012 -0.0050 0.0541 -0.0274 0.0234 
ΔCAR(-1,+3) 272 -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0615 -0.0308 0.0298 
ΔCAR(-1,+4) 272 -0.0042 -0.0023 0.0640 -0.0369 0.0252 
ΔAVOL(0,+2) 272 0.2466 -0.0607 7.0001 -0.9244 0.8878 
ΔAVOL(0,+3) 272 0.1281 -0.0870 7.9734 -1.4397 1.3840 
ΔAVOL(0,+4) 272 0.1696 0.1099 8.6072 -1.5563 1.5266 
ΔAVOL(-1,+2) 272 0.1611 -0.0453 7.3067 -1.5691 1.3627 
ΔAVOL(-1,+3) 272 0.0314 -0.2194 8.3357 -1.9257 1.6797 
ΔAVOL(-1,+4) 272 0.0290 -0.1254 8.9102 -2.1646 1.8567 
SHORTEN 272 0.5000 0.5000 0.5009 0.0000 1.0000 
LoseReconcil 272 0.0588 0.0000 0.2357 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔAccruals 272 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0664 -0.0293 0.0270 
ΔAuditFee 272 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0000 
ΔAssets 272 0.0906 0.0443 0.2720 -0.0441 0.1898 
ΔSpecialItems 272 0.0068 0.0000 0.0577 -0.0009 0.0059 
ΔROA 272 0.0077 -0.0009 0.0734 -0.0243 0.0239 
ΔSales 272 0.0124 -0.0272 0.7659 -0.1689 0.0981 
ΔReadability 272 -0.3632 0.0000 1.9669 -0.8000 0.4000 
HomeReport1 272 0.0331 0.0000 0.1792 0.0000 0.0000 
HomeReport2 272 0.0294 0.0000 0.1693 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
ΔCAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems  
+ α8×ΔROA + α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε          
Panel E: Abnormal Return Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.00133  -0.00850  -0.00659  -0.00542  -0.01226 ** -0.00849  SHORTEN 0.00525  0.01458 ** 0.01502 ** 0.01235 * 0.02063 *** 0.01806 ** LoseReconcil -0.01342  -0.01698  -0.02729 * -0.02251  -0.02783 * -0.03753 ** ΔAccruals -0.10002 * -0.07963  -0.02906  -0.01405  -0.02866  0.00031  ΔAuditFee 2.37711  4.23841  7.91691 ** -0.12083  2.56349  10.1918 ** ΔAssets -0.01502  -0.02658 * -0.03654 ** -0.02275  -0.03051 * -0.02976  ΔSpecialItems 0.05143  0.10024  0.02637  0.03749  0.05422  0.00956  ΔROA 0.09610 ** 0.08377  0.000957  0.08892 * 0.13818 ** 0.05977  ΔSales 0.01042 ** 0.01008 ** 0.01218 ** 0.01040 ** 0.00690  0.01341 ** ΔReadability -0.00206  -0.00546 *** -0.00348 * -0.00240  -0.00596 *** -0.00531 *** HomeReport1 0.01725  0.01873  0.00846  0.01626  0.01547  0.00749  HomeReport2 -0.01134  0.00379  0.00230  0.00508  -0.00019  -0.00311  N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.0749  0.1112  0.0907  0.0846  0.1437  0.1389  Adj. R2 0.0245   0.0628   0.0412   0.0347   0.0971   0.0920   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
ΔAVOL = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccrual + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA 
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε          
Panel F: Abnormal Trading Volume Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.07186  -0.26531  -0.16452  -0.18656  -0.53153  -0.54340  SHORTEN 1.02428  1.37974  1.36261  1.21702  1.55858 # 1.67319 # LoseReconcil 0.34382  0.19988  0.00658  0.28316  0.12354  -0.22934  ΔAccruals -6.58129  -9.25552  -10.1110  -8.92723  -11.4320  -11.6714  ΔAuditFee 298.531  538.842  822.131  395.262  652.372  951.792  ΔAssets -3.19729  -2.8505  -2.14345  -2.45468  -1.88090  -1.08943  ΔSpecialItems -4.57865  -6.00115  -10.3847  -3.35897  -5.65345  -10.0011  ΔROA 1.90899  2.63870  2.11383  4.00445  6.65169  5.08657  ΔSales 0.35510  0.22358  0.08382  0.11760  -0.03631  -0.22074  ΔReadability -0.33802  -0.38721  -0.42826  -0.38069  -0.42415  -0.45571  HomeReport1 -0.41310  -0.07686  2.10595  -1.08835  -0.75394  1.52920  HomeReport2 0.11195  -0.02113  0.71402  -0.67936  -0.73297  -0.02772  N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.0478  0.0506  0.0608  0.0476  0.0523  0.0611  Adj. R2 -0.0041   -0.0011   0.0096   -0.0043   0.0007   0.0099   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
# Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis of Size Effect on Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Standard Acceleration Sample 
Panel A: Level Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
CAR(0,+2) 272 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0531 -0.0194 0.0213 
CAR(0,+3) 272 0.0035 -0.0017 0.0586 -0.0239 0.0272 
CAR(0,+4) 272 0.0044 0.0002 0.0634 -0.0233 0.0326 
CAR(-1,+2) 272 0.0035 0.0015 0.0619 -0.0221 0.0269 
CAR(-1,+3) 272 0.0062 0.0001 0.0677 -0.0217 0.0388 
CAR(-1,+4) 272 0.0071 0.0056 0.0726 -0.0222 0.0401 
AVOL(0,+2) 272 0.5675 -0.8186 6.3750 -1.5142 0.8271 
AVOL(0,+3) 272 0.5967 -1.0826 7.0429 -1.9498 0.9822 
AVOL(0,+4) 272 0.5440 -1.3382 7.5363 -2.5962 1.3953 
AVOL(-1,+2) 272 0.5593 -0.9931 6.6398 -1.9128 0.9965 
AVOL(-1,+3) 272 0.5886 -1.1665 7.3446 -2.3175 0.9370 
AVOL(-1,+4) 272 0.5358 -1.4238 7.8523 -2.8431 1.3669 
SHORTEN 272 0.5000 0.5000 0.5009 0.0000 1.0000 
Small 272 0.2206 0.0000 0.4154 0.0000 0.0000 
Medium 272 0.3309 0.0000 0.4714 0.0000 1.0000 
Large 272 0.4485 0.0000 0.4983 0.0000 1.0000 
Reconcil 272 0.1397 0.0000 0.3473 0.0000 0.0000 
Assets 272 7.5761 7.0870 2.3253 5.6916 9.4470 
Readability 272 11.7824 11.6000 2.0066 10.8000 12.4000 
HomeReport 272 0.2574 0.0000 0.4380 0.0000 1.0000 
Leverage 272 0.4848 0.4869 0.2579 0.2448 0.6984 
MTB 272 1.2863 0.8415 1.3097 0.4417 1.5934 
Accruals 272 0.0766 0.0604 0.0651 0.0287 0.1015 
AuditFee 272 0.0016 0.0007 0.0022 0.0002 0.0021 
ROA 272 0.0816 0.0564 0.0864 0.0212 0.1059 
Sales 272 0.3434 0.1663 0.7631 0.0611 0.3562 
SpecialItems 272 0.0165 0.0007 0.0470 0.0000 0.0102 
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis of Size Effect on Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
CAR  = α1 + α2×Small + α3×Large + α4×SHORTEN*Small + α5×SHORTEN*Medium + α6×SHORTEN*Large +α7×Reconcil  
+ α8×Assets + α9×Readability + α10×HomeReport + α11×Leverage + α12×MTB + α13×Accruals + α14×AuditFee  
+ α15×ROA+ α16×Sales + α17×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε.  
Panel B: Abnormal Return Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.01818   -0.00512   -0.03734   0.02357   0.03664   0.00440   Small 0.00827   0.00023   -0.00456   0.00165   -0.00639   -0.01118   Large 0.00498   0.00100   0.00548   0.01281   0.00882   0.01330   SHORTEN*Small 0.00615   0.00260   0.00723   0.01094   0.00738   0.01202   SHORTEN*Medium 0.03062  *** 0.03334  *** 0.03080  ** 0.02357  * 0.02629  * 0.02375  # 
SHORTEN*Large 0.02262  ** 0.02112  ** 0.02762  ** 0.01685  # 0.01536   0.02185  * Reconcil -0.00701   -0.00147   -0.01120   -0.00158   0.00395   -0.00577   Assets -0.00067   -0.00013   0.00006   -0.00288   -0.00233   -0.00214   Readability 0.00218   0.00185   0.00225   0.00147   0.00114   0.00154   HomeReport -0.01291   -0.01573   -0.01948  * -0.00930   -0.01213   -0.01588   Leverage -0.00450   -0.02184   -0.01425   -0.00342   -0.02076   -0.01317   MTB -0.00393   -0.00372   -0.00454   -0.00139   -0.00118   -0.00200   Accruals -0.05474   -0.07623   -0.09329   -0.03937   -0.06088   -0.07792   AuditFee -4.07968  * -4.95264  ** -4.99985  ** -5.64577  ** -6.51892  ** -6.56554  ** 
ROA 0.03486   0.04394   0.02772   0.01001   0.01910   0.00287   Sales -0.00197   -0.00139   -0.00121   0.00332   0.00390   0.00408   SpecialItems 0.24690  *** 0.26335  *** 0.28825  *** 0.32676  *** 0.34322  *** 0.36812  *** 
N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.1536  0.1662  0.1826  0.1222  0.1355  0.1459  Adj. R2 0.0638   0.0777   0.0959   0.029   0.0438   0.0552   
72 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in 
the appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis of Size Effect on Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
AVOL = α1 + α2×Small + α3×Large + α4×SHORTEN*Small + α5×SHORTEN*Medium + α6×SHORTEN*Large +α7×Reconcil  
+ α8×Assets + α9×Readability + α10×HomeReport + α11×Leverage + α12×MTB + α13×Accruals + α14×AuditFee  
+ α15×ROA+ α16×Sales + α17×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 4.61765  4.8337  3.98608  5.28541  5.50145  4.65384  Small -1.37040  -1.86709  -1.91421  -1.56158  -2.05827  -2.10539  Large -0.33242  -0.74643  -1.15255  -0.01308  -0.42709  -0.83321  SHORTEN*Small 2.77104 # 3.06286 # 3.43346 * 2.98505 # 3.27687 # 3.64747 * 
SHORTEN*Medium -0.78198  -0.67216  -0.38224  -0.98972  -0.87990  -0.58998  SHORTEN*Large -0.33885  0.06322  0.40075  -0.73323  -0.33116  0.00637  Reconcil -0.82265  -1.22970  -1.30824  -0.97526  -1.38231  -1.46085  Assets -0.05669  -0.09031  0.05741  -0.09342  -0.12704  0.02068  Readability -0.31196  -0.37492  -0.37673  -0.32247  -0.38544  -0.38724  HomeReport -0.51944  -0.57300  -1.14846  -0.86316  -0.91671  -1.49218  Leverage 0.74271  0.68026  1.02537  0.88420  0.82174  1.16685  MTB 0.68350  0.56237  0.46617  0.61827 * 0.49714  0.40094  Accruals -4.24599  -4.92468  -6.27316  -5.30032  -5.97901  -7.32748  AuditFee -280.316  -279.236  -307.911  -312.621  -311.541  -340.216  ROA 2.90836  1.88801  1.00214  2.24763  1.22728  0.34141  Sales -0.14227  -0.24783  -0.17475  -0.17570  -0.28126  -0.20818  SpecialItems 0.26496  0.18728  1.14530  1.61599  1.53832  2.49633  N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.0645  0.0634  0.0657  0.0659  0.0638  0.0662  Adj. R2 -0.0348   -0.0360   -0.0334   -0.0333   -0.0356   -0.0329   
74 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in 
the appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis of Size Effect on Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Standard Acceleration Sample 
Panel D: Change Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
ΔCAR(0,+2) 272 0.0008  -0.0007  0.0474  -0.0231  0.0151  
ΔCAR(0,+3) 272 -0.0011  -0.0026  0.0552  -0.0302  0.0220  
ΔCAR(0,+4) 272 -0.0050  -0.0019  0.0575  -0.0336  0.0216  
ΔCAR(-1,+2) 272 0.0012  -0.0050  0.0541  -0.0274  0.0234  
ΔCAR(-1,+3) 272 -0.0005  -0.0013  0.0615  -0.0308  0.0298  
ΔCAR(-1,+4) 272 -0.0042  -0.0023  0.0640  -0.0369  0.0252  
ΔAVOL(0,+2) 272 0.2466  -0.0607  7.0001  -0.9244  0.8878  
ΔAVOL(0,+3) 272 0.1281  -0.0870  7.9734  -1.4397  1.3840  
ΔAVOL(0,+4) 272 0.1696  0.1099  8.6072  -1.5563  1.5266  
ΔAVOL(-1,+2) 272 0.1611  -0.0453  7.3067  -1.5691  1.3627  
ΔAVOL(-1,+3) 272 0.0314  -0.2194  8.3357  -1.9257  1.6797  
ΔAVOL(-1,+4) 272 0.0290  -0.1254  8.9102  -2.1646  1.8567  
SHORTEN 272 0.5000  0.5000  0.5009  0.0000  1.0000  
Small 272 0.4485  0.0000  0.4983  0.0000  1.0000  
Medium 272 0.3309  0.0000  0.4714  0.0000  1.0000  
Large 272 0.2206  0.0000  0.4154  0.0000  0.0000  
LoseReconcil 272 0.0588  0.0000  0.2357  0.0000  0.0000  
ΔAccruals 272 0.0013  -0.0020  0.0664  -0.0293  0.0270  
ΔAuditFee 272 -0.0003  0.0000  0.0009  -0.0002  0.0000  
ΔAssets 272 0.0906  0.0443  0.2720  -0.0441  0.1898  
ΔSpecialItems 272 0.0068  0.0000  0.0577  -0.0009  0.0059  
ΔROA 272 0.0077  -0.0009  0.0734  -0.0243  0.0239  
ΔSales 272 0.0124  -0.0272  0.7659  -0.1689  0.0981  
ΔReadability 272 -0.3632  0.0000  1.9669  -0.8000  0.4000  
HomeReport1 272 0.0331  0.0000  0.1792  0.0000  0.0000  
HomeReport2 272 0.0294  0.0000  0.1693  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis of Size Effect on Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
ΔCAR  =α1 + α2×Small + α3×Large + α4×SHORTEN*Small + α5×SHORTEN*Medium+ α6×SHORTEN*Large   
+ α7×LoseReconcil + α8×ΔAccrual + α9×ΔAuditFee + α10×ΔAssets + α11×ΔSpecialItems + α12×ΔROA + α13×ΔSales  
+ α14×ΔReadability +α15×HomeReport1 + α16×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε     
Panel E: Abnormal Return Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.01014  -0.00290  0.00008  0.00296  -0.00796  -0.00541  Small -0.01176  -0.00889  -0.00723  -0.00500  -0.00461  0.00346  Large -0.02000 * -0.00883  -0.01136  -0.01620  -0.00748  -0.00792  SHORTEN*Small -0.01009  0.00334  0.00868  -0.00337  0.00888  0.01122  SHORTEN*Medium 0.00035  0.01867 # 0.01111  0.00915  0.01919 # 0.01155  SHORTEN*Large 0.01619 * 0.01684 * 0.02093 ** 0.02220 ** 0.02748 ** 0.02622 ** 
LoseReconcil -0.01321  -0.01666  -0.02714 * -0.02226  -0.02832 * -0.03767 ** ΔAccruals -0.09316 * -0.07058  -0.02663  -0.00726  -0.02401  -0.00053  ΔAuditFee 1.63055  3.22432  7.64750 * -0.53264  1.61009  10.5820 ** ΔAssets -0.01858  -0.02907 * -0.03839 ** -0.02477  -0.03344 * -0.02973  ΔSpecialItems 0.03835  0.09560  0.01870  0.02741  0.04899  0.00389  ΔROA 0.09006 * 0.07745  -0.00146  0.08238  0.13532 ** 0.05868  ΔSales 0.01035 ** 0.01020 ** 0.01213 ** 0.01020 ** 0.00705  0.01313 ** ΔReadability -0.00190  -0.00535 *** -0.00339 * -0.00224  -0.00592 *** -0.00526 *** HomeReport1 0.01758  0.01878  0.00888  0.01644  0.01433  0.00737  HomeReport2 -0.01407  0.00278  0.000824  0.00341  -0.00272  -0.00405  N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.1064  0.1262  0.0963  0.1008  0.1502  0.1427  Adj. R2 0.0429   0.0640   0.0320   0.0368   0.0897   0.0817   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis of Size Effect on Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Standard Acceleration Sample 
78 
ΔAVOL  =α1 + α2×Small + α3×Large + α4×SHORTEN*Small + α5×SHORTEN*Medium+ α6×SHORTEN*Large   
+ α7×LoseReconcil + α8×ΔAccrual + α9×ΔAuditFee + α10×ΔAssets + α11×ΔSpecialItems + α12×ΔROA + α13×ΔSales 
+ α14×ΔReadability +α15×HomeReport1 + α16×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε     
Panel F: Abnormal Trading Volume Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.07189  -0.46915  -0.59065  -0.04316  -0.58371  -0.81734  Small 0.22907  0.57709  1.43154  -0.08289  0.25537  1.09507  Large -0.05198  0.21705  0.30534  -0.21798  0.03764  0.12921  SHORTEN*Small 3.01416 # 3.15650 # 2.77123  3.44028 * 3.52548 # 3.30943 # SHORTEN*Medium 0.56178  1.36638  1.84317  0.54126  1.31595  1.96016  SHORTEN*Large 0.36831  0.48549  0.25618  0.60780  0.74521  0.60095  LoseReconcil 0.50059  0.38039  0.26444  0.43865  0.29758  0.02959  ΔAccruals -7.50400  -9.88500  -10.3571  -10.0092  -12.2153  -12.0568  ΔAuditFee 533.925  774.774  1124.85 * 632.716  885.513  1255.11 * ΔAssets -2.67999  -2.23834  -1.24078  -1.98571  -1.33219  -0.23718  ΔSpecialItems -4.57446  -5.71261  -9.83300  -3.51494  -5.54026  -9.61152  ΔROA 2.26764  2.75883  1.75453  4.49456  6.90593  4.84497  ΔSales 0.29551  0.15896  -0.01688  0.06131  -0.09637  -0.31789  ΔReadability -0.33200  -0.379  -0.41110  -0.37534  -0.41684  -0.43895  HomeReport1 -0.03270  0.30581  2.57283  -0.68414  -0.35727  2.02308  HomeReport2 0.54423  0.52567  1.53304  -0.29133  -0.24621  0.74975  N 272  272  272  272  272  272  R2 0.0606  0.0607  0.0742  0.0601  0.0613  0.0732  Adj. R2 -0.0062   -0.0061   0.0083   -0.0068   -0.0055   0.0072   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 6 
Analysis of Annual Report Quality-Full Standard Acceleration Sample 
Panel A: Restatement 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference 
                   (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 0.00% 3.68% 3.68%       (N=136)   (2.27)  ** Matched Sample 0.74% 0.00% -0.74%  
   (1.00)    Test of Difference in Differences  4.41%        (2.48)   ** 
 
Panel B: 20-F/A 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference 
                    (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 16.91% 22.06% 5.15%       (N=136)   (1.07)  Matched Sample 16.91% 29.41% 12.50%  
   (2.46) ** Test of Difference in Differences  -7.35%        (1.05)   
 
Panel C: Readability 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference 
                  (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 12.032 11.597 -0.435       (N=136)   (-1.89) * Matched Sample 12.259 11.968 -0.291  
   (-1.07)  Test of Difference in Differences  -0.144        (-0.60)   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of mean difference. Using the 
restatement file from Audit Analytics, I classify a firm as a restatement firm if the firm restated its 
financial statements within 18 months of the original 20-F filing date. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 7 
Analysis of Changes in Restatement-Standard Acceleration Sample by Size 
Panel A: Large Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference 
                  (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%       (N=61)     Matched Sample 1.64% 0.00% -1.64%  
   (1.00)   Test of Difference in Differences  1.64%        (1.00)    
 
Panel B: Medium Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                   (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 0.00% 6.67% 6.67%       (N=45)   (1.77)  * Matched Sample 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
     Test of Difference in Differences  6.67%        (1.77)  * 
 
Panel C: Small Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                 (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 0.00% 6.67% 6.67%       (N=30)   (1.44)   Matched Sample 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
     Test of Difference in Differences  6.67%        (1.44)    
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of mean difference. Using the 
restatement file from Audit Analytics, I classify a firm as a restatement firm if the firm restated its 
financial statements within 18 months of the original 20-F filing date. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 8 
Analysis of Changes in 20F/A Issuance-Standard Acceleration Sample by Size 
Panel A: Large Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                  (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 19.67% 16.39% -3.28%       (N=61)   (0.47)   Matched Sample 16.39% 21.31% 4.92%  
   (0.69)   Test of Difference in Differences  -8.20%        (0.82)    
 
Panel B: Medium Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                     (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 17.78% 26.67% 8.89%       (N=45)   (1.01)   Matched Sample 15.56% 40.00% 24.44% *** 
   (2.66)   Test of Difference in Differences  -15.56%        (1.22)    
 
Panel C: Small Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                   (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 10.00% 26.67% 16.67%       (N=30)   (1.68)  * Matched Sample 20.00% 30.00% 10.00%  
   (0.89)   Test of Difference in Differences  6.67%        (0.44)    
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of mean difference.  
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TABLE 9 
Analysis of Changes in Readability-Standard Acceleration Sample by Size 
Panel A: Large Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                 (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 11.882 11.633 0.249       (N=61)   (0.84)  Matched Sample 12.039 11.908 0.131  
   (0.27)  Test of Difference in Differences  0.118        (0.37)   
 
Panel B: Medium Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                 (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 12.222 11.547 0.675       (N=45)   (1.39)  Matched Sample 12.311 11.929 0.382  
   (1.14)  Test of Difference in Differences  0.293        (0.71)   
 
Panel C: Small Firms 
  Preacceleration Acceleration Within-Firm Difference  
                 (t-stat)  Shortened Firms 12.053 11.6 0.453       (N=30)   (0.99)  Matched Sample 12.627 12.147 0.48  
   (0.85)  Test of Difference in Differences  0.027        (0.04)   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of mean difference.  
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TABLE 10 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Voluntary Type 1 Acceleration Sample 
Panel A: Level Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
CAR(0,+2) 46 -0.0103  -0.0047  0.0710  -0.0284  0.0159  
CAR(0,+3) 46 -0.0111  -0.0092  0.0745  -0.0289  0.0167  
CAR(0,+4) 46 -0.0116  -0.0101  0.0817  -0.0395  0.0301  
CAR(-1,+2) 46 -0.0010  -0.0008  0.1025  -0.0345  0.0198  
CAR(-1,+3) 46 -0.0019  -0.0084  0.0969  -0.0335  0.0210  
CAR(-1,+4) 46 -0.0023  -0.0062  0.0992  -0.0375  0.0239  
AVOL(0,+2) 46 1.8833  -0.6795  9.0063  -1.8047  2.0408  
AVOL(0,+3) 46 1.7086  -1.0795  9.7411  -2.7636  1.4793  
AVOL(0,+4) 46 1.5850  -1.2614  10.1490  -2.8418  1.7286  
AVOL(-1,+2) 46 3.8138  -0.7446  21.1821  -2.3331  1.7835  
AVOL(-1,+3) 46 3.6391  -0.9753  21.5324  -3.3533  1.6245  
AVOL(-1,+4) 46 3.5155  -1.5854  21.8121  -3.2860  2.0444  
SHORTEN 46 0.5000  0.5000  0.5055  0.0000  1.0000  
Reconcil 46 0.1087  0.0000  0.3147  0.0000  0.0000  
Assets 46 7.4541  7.3537  2.7696  5.2229  9.4429  
Readability 46 12.0609  12.0000  1.7788  11.2000  12.8000  
HomeReport 46 0.1522  0.0000  0.3632  0.0000  0.0000  
Leverage 46 0.4456  0.4390  0.2551  0.2058  0.6177  
MTB 46 1.0872  0.7327  1.0359  0.4718  1.1772  
Accruals 46 0.0821  0.0519  0.0788  0.0261  0.1061  
AuditFee 46 0.0016  0.0007  0.0024  0.0003  0.0018  
ROA 46 0.0851  0.0629  0.0862  0.0360  0.0947  
Sales 46 0.2136  0.1555  0.2460  0.0636  0.2442  
SpecialItems 46 0.0125  0.0000  0.0461  0.0000  0.0081  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 10 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 1 Acceleration Sample 
CAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.00551  -0.04756  0.02987  -0.03118  -0.07324  0.00422  SHORTEN 0.01604  0.01083  0.00931  0.05866  0.05344  0.05192 # Reconcil 0.03008  0.02937  0.01212  0.07706  0.07635  0.0591  Assets -0.00535  -0.00589  -0.01044  -0.02094  -0.02148  -0.02602 * Readability 0.00773  0.00835  0.00603  0.01431  0.01492  0.0126  HomeReport 0.00473  0.00577  0.01155  0.03557  0.03661  0.04239  Leverage -0.0186  -0.00484  -0.02595  0.14598  0.15974  0.13863  MTB -0.01141  -0.00686  -0.00074  -0.02711  -0.02256  -0.01644  Accruals -0.29019  -0.29542  -0.50346 * 0.01335  0.00814  -0.19993  AuditFee -1.75964  0.63306  -1.71633  1.80732  4.20016  1.84963  ROA -0.43484 * -0.57064 ** -0.44339  -0.44364  -0.57944 * -0.45219  Sales 0.024  0.02327  0.0698  -0.08565  -0.08639  -0.03985  SpecialItems 0.72464 * 0.72674 * 0.41448  0.89086  0.89291  0.58068  N 46  46  46  46  46  46  R2 0.4236  0.4309  0.443  0.3519  0.3895  0.4247  Adj. R2 0.0024   0.0150   0.0360   -0.1217   -0.0566   0.0043   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 10 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 1 Acceleration Sample 
AVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 10.94818  12.00328  9.76477  10.52942  11.58452  9.346  SHORTEN 0.99988  0.66345  0.67606  6.07037  5.73394  5.74654  Reconcil 2.26645  1.79795  1.53348  9.35504  8.88654  8.62208  Assets -1.50785  -1.7203  -1.74347  -4.17131  -4.38376  -4.40692  Readability -0.65318  -0.62257  -0.55981  0.09064  0.12124  0.184  HomeReport -0.9547  -1.37217  -1.57033  2.66458  2.2471  2.04895  Leverage 17.08157 * 18.42463 * 17.89468  40.2123  41.55537  41.02542  MTB 4.4277 ** 4.78897 *** 5.11893 *** 2.07922  2.44049  2.77045  Accruals 7.47527  9.62115  12.60997  73.11745  75.26333  78.25214  AuditFee -174.112  -304.153  -198.142  740.5429  610.5021  716.5132  ROA 0.6394  -0.55515  -5.17132  -1.30473  -2.49929  -7.11545  Sales -4.22205  -4.81023  -4.66655  -18.4157  -19.0039  -18.8602  SpecialItems -37.9681  -41.2851  -43.4413  -77.7966  -81.1136  -83.2697  N 46  46  46  46  46  46  R2 0.4462  0.4625  0.4763  0.3884  0.3924  0.3992  Adj. R2 0.0416   0.0697   0.0937   -0.0585   -0.0516   -0.0398   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 10 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Voluntary Type 1 Acceleration Sample 
Panel D: Change Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
ΔCAR(0,+2) 46 -0.0076  -0.0047  0.0806  -0.0236  0.0208  
ΔCAR(0,+3) 46 -0.0084  -0.0016  0.0721  -0.0332  0.0183  
ΔCAR(0,+4) 46 -0.0021  -0.0002  0.0745  -0.0247  0.0302  
ΔCAR(-1,+2) 46 0.0014  -0.0023  0.0983  -0.0228  0.0226  
ΔCAR(-1,+3) 46 -0.0076  -0.0081  0.0893  -0.0397  0.0228  
ΔCAR(-1,+4) 46 -0.0036  0.0008  0.0960  -0.0390  0.0327  
ΔAVOL(0,+2) 46 1.5644  -0.3192  8.8549  -1.3551  1.2227  
ΔAVOL(0,+3) 46 1.8175  -0.0889  9.3791  -1.5476  2.1830  
ΔAVOL(0,+4) 46 1.7919  0.1859  9.6708  -1.6682  2.1702  
ΔAVOL(-1,+2) 46 3.5482  -0.2094  21.1041  -1.9144  2.4075  
ΔAVOL(-1,+3) 46 3.7739  -0.0678  21.2750  -2.4214  2.5621  
ΔAVOL(-1,+4) 46 3.7513  0.1713  21.4388  -2.3773  2.2130  
SHORTEN 46 0.5000  0.5000  0.5055  0.0000  1.0000  
LoseReconcil 46 0.0217  0.0000  0.1474  0.0000  0.0000  
ΔAccruals 46 0.0061  0.0059  0.0991  -0.0513  0.0556  
ΔAuditFee 46 -0.0001  0.0000  0.0008  -0.0002  0.0000  
ΔAssets 46 0.0576  0.0022  0.2376  -0.0638  0.1634  
ΔSpecialItems 46 0.0034  0.0000  0.0542  -0.0016  0.0000  
ΔROA 46 0.0050  0.0016  0.0884  -0.0240  0.0377  
ΔSales 46 -0.0046  0.0080  0.2391  -0.0913  0.0837  
ΔReadability 46 0.4783  0.0000  1.9204  -0.4000  1.6000  
HomeReport1 46 0.0435  0.0000  0.2062  0.0000  0.0000  
HomeReport2 46 0.0217  0.0000  0.1474  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 10 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 1 Acceleration Sample 
ΔCAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε        
Panel E: Abnormal Return Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.00784  0.01235  0.01507  -0.00437  0.000697  -0.00572  SHORTEN 0.0126  0.00202  0.00966  0.02572  0.01759  0.03466  LoseReconcil -0.03169  -0.01623  -0.03298  -0.01579  -0.00867  -0.01358  ΔAccruals 0.17335  0.42861 *** 0.39848 *** 0.31679  0.53141 *** 0.55435 *** ΔAuditFee -7.65941  -9.41241  -20.5038  -9.64335  -7.78977  -19.5112  ΔAssets -0.0149  -0.03151  -0.08883  -0.10279  -0.10839  -0.1522 * ΔSpecialItems -0.57721  -0.45472  -0.07759  -0.17515  -0.34078  -0.18638  ΔROA 0.19146  0.10709  0.03756  -0.05673  0.014  -0.10176  ΔSales -0.02821  -0.00189  0.00805  0.000236  0.01499  0.01441  ΔReadability 0.00218  -0.0013  -0.0045  0.00253  -0.00149  -0.00499  HomeReport1 0.05736  0.07234  0.09354  0.04459  0.05007  0.07553  HomeReport2 -0.03372  -0.01407  0.02301  -0.02297  -0.00627  0.04692  N 46  46  46  46  46  46  R2 0.1867  0.3255  0.3752  0.1796  0.3911  0.4262  Adj. R2 -0.1805   0.0209   0.0930   -0.1909   0.1161   0.1671   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 10 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 1 Acceleration Sample 
ΔAVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε      
Panel F: Abnormal Trading Volume Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 3.58487  4.42259  5.04914  -0.26898  0.40366  1.04384  SHORTEN 0.55745  -0.20661  -0.45911  7.6458  7.12305  6.76634  LoseReconcil -3.70356  -5.94301  -7.88517  -6.71755  -9.22756  -11.0693  ΔAccruals 28.85258  31.24982  30.81476  74.39725  76.29328 * 76.24299 * ΔAuditFee -842.954  -1286.41  -1347.59  -3830.72  -4083.69  -4179.43  ΔAssets -8.8891  -8.21622  -7.57846  -30.5315 * -30.0692  -29.6011  ΔSpecialItems -15.3157  -16.1505  -19.5888  61.16787  58.11124  53.39548  ΔROA -5.37011  -7.28354  -7.0158  -91.6985  -91.8519  -90.9154 * ΔSales -5.45891  -7.06592  -7.96597  0.1811  -1.85267  -2.70869  ΔReadability -0.50269  -0.43991  -0.38522  -0.64195  -0.59663  -0.56738  HomeReport1 8.29859  7.49234  5.58662  13.51135  12.73139  11.20553  HomeReport2 -0.57947  -0.811  -1.04771  10.46309  10.25252  9.77708  N 46  46  46  46  46  46  R2 0.1579  0.1539  0.1551  0.3265  0.3167  0.308  Adj. R2 -0.2224   -0.2282   -0.2264   0.0223   0.0080   -0.0045   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 11 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Voluntary Type 2 Acceleration Sample 
Panel A: Level Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
CAR(0,+2) 56 0.0060  0.0015  0.0585  -0.0236  0.0264  
CAR(0,+3) 56 0.0124  0.0122  0.0731  -0.0347  0.0370  
CAR(0,+4) 56 0.0184  0.0077  0.0864  -0.0201  0.0362  
CAR(-1,+2) 56 0.0060  -0.0039  0.0688  -0.0339  0.0187  
CAR(-1,+3) 56 0.0123  0.0029  0.0871  -0.0283  0.0388  
CAR(-1,+4) 56 0.0184  0.0055  0.0995  -0.0197  0.0440  
AVOL(0,+2) 56 0.9172  -0.6413  3.9660  -1.2595  0.5898  
AVOL(0,+3) 56 1.8184  -0.7386  7.2489  -1.4988  0.8184  
AVOL(0,+4) 56 2.2780  -0.6343  8.9377  -1.8369  0.9514  
AVOL(-1,+2) 56 0.9558  -0.8550  4.4861  -1.7332  1.1030  
AVOL(-1,+3) 56 1.8569  -0.6136  7.5880  -1.9562  2.6888  
AVOL(-1,+4) 56 2.3166  -0.8970  9.2652  -2.2269  2.4759  
SHORTEN 56 0.5000  0.5000  0.5045  0.0000  1.0000  
Reconcil 56 0.1071  0.0000  0.3121  0.0000  0.0000  
Assets 56 8.0441  7.3259  2.4699  6.2856  9.4606  
Readability 56 12.4643  12.4000  2.1025  11.2000  13.2000  
HomeReport 56 0.2143  0.0000  0.4140  0.0000  0.0000  
Leverage 56 0.5141  0.5088  0.2623  0.3232  0.7001  
MTB 56 1.2500  0.7265  1.8884  0.3732  1.5429  
Accruals 56 0.0754  0.0592  0.0526  0.0350  0.1194  
AuditFee 56 0.0010  0.0006  0.0010  0.0003  0.0011  
ROA 56 0.0889  0.0578  0.1757  0.0270  0.0971  
Sales 56 0.2611  0.1526  0.3362  0.0494  0.3320  
SpecialItems 56 0.0102  0.0017  0.0246  0.0000  0.0071  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 11 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 2 Acceleration Sample 
CAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.13268  0.11177  0.04036  0.12884  0.10792  0.03653  SHORTEN -0.01645  -0.0217  -0.01361  -0.02421  -0.02946 # -0.02137  Reconcil 0.01275  -0.00481  0.02322  -0.00511  -0.02267  0.00536  Assets -0.01147 ** -0.00235  -0.00204  -0.01054 * -0.00142  -0.00111  Readability -0.00808 ** -0.006  -0.0046  -0.00829 * -0.00622  -0.00481  HomeReport -0.0472 * -0.02391  -0.01473  -0.05181 * -0.02852  -0.01934  Leverage 0.06702  -0.0203  0.08132  0.04713  -0.04018  0.06143  MTB 0.00721  0.01054 * 0.00982  0.00923 * 0.01256 ** 0.01184 * Accruals -0.1142  -0.27949  -0.39915 * -0.10729  -0.27255  -0.39222  AuditFee -17.7395  13.39944  26.90475  -13.6401  17.49929  31.00252  ROA -0.06072  -0.17755 *** -0.14409 ** -0.05538  -0.17222 * -0.13875 * Sales 0.03749  0.02105  0.07838 ** 0.03012  0.01368  0.07101 * SpecialItems -0.38292  -0.40416  -0.63331  -0.39091  -0.41215  -0.64134  N 56  56  56  56  56  56  R2 0.5561  0.6415  0.6286  0.6023  0.6604  0.6536  Adj. R2 0.3024   0.4367   0.4164   0.3750   0.4664   0.4557   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 2 Acceleration Sample 
AVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -12.196  -23.701  -28.0764 ** -15.9855 * -27.4905 ** -31.8659 ** SHORTEN 1.21679  -0.60119  -1.44197  1.13594  -0.68204  -1.52282  Reconcil -0.10096  -4.6107  -6.49153  -0.47831  -4.98804  -6.86888  Assets 0.89759 * 1.98228 *** 2.40761 *** 1.24491 ** 2.3296 *** 2.75492 *** 
Readability 0.4543  0.65245  0.7738  0.4343  0.63245  0.7538  HomeReport -1.17007  -0.88108  -2.12655  -1.79978  -1.51079  -2.75626  Leverage 0.87479  -4.12477  -5.90997  1.21236  -3.78721  -5.5724  MTB -0.58208  -0.31451  -0.49039  -0.62987  -0.36229  -0.53817  Accruals 15.33268  -3.62463  -3.10159  16.25706  -2.70025  -2.17721  AuditFee 1322.318  5586.767 *** 6741.863 *** 1673.859  5938.308 *** 7093.405 *** ROA 2.13769  -1.87129  -2.75093  3.76487  -0.24412  -1.12375  Sales -1.55104  -5.84757 * -6.71094 * -1.64532  -5.94184 * -6.80522 * SpecialItems -16.4583  -26.8927  -26.2152  -16.819  -27.2534  -26.5759  R2 0.3333  0.5736  0.5721  0.3563  0.5727  0.5715  Adj. R2 -0.0476   0.3299   0.3275   -0.0115   0.3286   0.3267   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 11 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Voluntary Type 2 Acceleration Sample 
Panel D: Change Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
ΔCAR(0,+2) 56 -0.0094  -0.0017  0.0674  -0.0279  0.0144  
ΔCAR(0,+3) 56 -0.0054  -0.0033  0.0856  -0.0345  0.0288  
ΔCAR(0,+4) 56 0.0018  -0.0042  0.0942  -0.0441  0.0316  
ΔCAR(-1,+2) 56 -0.0159  -0.0062  0.0851  -0.0380  0.0216  
ΔCAR(-1,+3) 56 -0.0091  0.0022  0.1020  -0.0458  0.0255  
ΔCAR(-1,+4) 56 -0.0041  -0.0070  0.1048  -0.0472  0.0253  
ΔAVOL(0,+2) 56 -0.1381  0.2146  5.4468  -1.6291  1.0240  
ΔAVOL(0,+3) 56 -0.1708  -0.3168  9.4187  -2.3886  1.7172  
ΔAVOL(0,+4) 56 -0.4303  -0.7798  11.1543  -3.1855  1.3719  
ΔAVOL(-1,+2) 56 -0.4296  -0.0946  6.6140  -2.1156  1.4957  
ΔAVOL(-1,+3) 56 -0.5014  -0.3174  10.4345  -3.2207  1.5264  
ΔAVOL(-1,+4) 56 -0.7383  -0.5333  12.1031  -3.7216  1.4921  
SHORTEN 56 0.5000  0.5000  0.5045  0.0000  1.0000  
LoseReconcil 56 0.0179  0.0000  0.1336  0.0000  0.0000  
ΔAccruals 56 -0.0027  -0.0022  0.0522  -0.0209  0.0212  
ΔAuditFee 56 -0.0003  0.0000  0.0009  -0.0002  0.0000  
ΔAssets 56 0.0944  0.0750  0.1725  -0.0165  0.1930  
ΔSpecialItems 56 -0.0022  0.0000  0.0409  -0.0044  0.0028  
ΔROA 56 -0.0026  -0.0017  0.1729  -0.0319  0.0181  
ΔSales 56 -1.2498  -0.0346  8.6029  -0.1542  0.0955  
ΔReadability 56 -0.2857  -0.2000  1.8302  -0.8000  0.8000  
HomeReport1 56 0.0357  0.0000  0.1873  0.0000  0.0000  
HomeReport2 56 0.0357  0.0000  0.1873  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 11 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 2 Acceleration Sample 
ΔCAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε        
Panel E: Abnormal Return Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.01038  0.07771 ** 0.08818 ** 0.01153  0.08276 ** 0.09366 ** SHORTEN 0.00217  -0.02807  -0.02524  0.00269  -0.02284  -0.01898  LoseReconcil 0.00257  -0.03014  -0.03815  -0.00663  -0.05303  -0.05424  ΔAccruals 0.08778  0.07087  0.41108  0.15656  0.08867  0.4516  ΔAuditFee -1.72382  8.24538  0.23584  -4.49139  -0.3551  -5.96001  ΔAssets -0.02815  -0.05068  -0.07651  0.00269  -0.04434  -0.04764  ΔSpecialItems 0.20754  -0.14465  -0.63151  0.35394  -0.05093  -0.6218  ΔROA 0.08165  0.10715  0.07589  0.02808  0.05455  0.02284  ΔSales 0.000305  -0.00029  0.00113  -0.00051  -0.00084  0.000482  ΔReadability -0.0039  -0.00648  -0.00411  -0.00405  -0.00896  -0.00492  HomeReport1 0.16506 *** 0.11846 * 0.17357 ** 0.17759 *** 0.13559  0.1847 ** HomeReport2 -0.01831  -0.04361  -0.0561  0.00999  -0.01681  -0.02179  N 56  56  56  56  56  56  R2 0.4402  0.3152  0.3659  0.3617  0.2663  0.3491  Adj. R2 0.2490   0.0813   0.1494   0.1437   0.0158   0.1268   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 11 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Voluntary Type 2 Acceleration Sample 
ΔAVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε      
Panel F: Abnormal Trading Volume Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 0.50759  5.85465  6.64395  -0.50644  4.71509  5.55623  SHORTEN 1.14214  -0.2551  -0.125  1.14492  -0.1699  -0.0069  LoseReconcil 10.13827  3.69786  1.75731  12.35373  6.12499  4.09833  ΔAccruals -9.51423  -20.2625  -33.872  -14.7802  -24.2765  -38.9666  ΔAuditFee -1451.69  -1444.34  -1997.32  -1513.11  -1527.95  -2123.82  ΔAssets 1.04938  -3.64991  -6.30246  1.10733  -3.23931  -6.45271  ΔSpecialItems 14.15396  -16.6525  -11.8729  8.67161  -22.4222  -17.3844  ΔROA -3.04336  -3.6608  -4.54347  -3.07369  -3.67821  -4.39139  ΔSales -0.00369  0.00329  0.00893  -0.01987  -0.0089  -0.00282  ΔReadability 0.24961  -0.30134  -0.41676  0.26884  -0.25714  -0.3869  HomeReport1 3.09611  6.78293  8.79293  3.20218  6.7828  8.88977  HomeReport2 1.75395  1.51154  1.93593  2.7718  3.5056  4.0008  N 56  56  56  56  56  56  R2 0.2295  0.1736  0.1719  0.1936  0.1554  0.1577  Adj. R2 -0.0336   -0.1086   -0.1109   -0.0818   -0.1329   -0.1299   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Chinese Firms Sample 
Panel A: Level Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
CAR(0,+2) 96 -0.0018  -0.0069  0.0583  -0.0225  0.0191  
CAR(0,+3) 96 0.0046  -0.0054  0.0589  -0.0269  0.0257  
CAR(0,+4) 96 0.0030  -0.0019  0.0649  -0.0237  0.0281  
CAR(-1,+2) 96 0.0037  0.0010  0.0608  -0.0225  0.0269  
CAR(-1,+3) 96 0.0102  0.0001  0.0606  -0.0163  0.0454  
CAR(-1,+4) 96 0.0086  0.0054  0.0675  -0.0171  0.0416  
AVOL(0,+2) 96 0.6817  -1.0169  8.5527  -1.5352  -0.3049  
AVOL(0,+3) 96 0.7058  -1.1919  9.2819  -2.0271  -0.0801  
AVOL(0,+4) 96 0.6630  -1.6211  9.8171  -2.8077  0.0126  
AVOL(-1,+2) 96 0.5544  -1.2152  8.6256  -2.0158  0.0394  
AVOL(-1,+3) 96 0.5784  -1.3929  9.3982  -2.4731  0.1211  
AVOL(-1,+4) 96 0.5356  -1.8233  9.9511  -3.0625  -0.3171  
SHORTEN 96 0.5000  0.5000  0.5026  0.0000  1.0000  
Reconcil 96 0.0313  0.0000  0.1749  0.0000  0.0000  
Assets 96 6.6129  6.0094  1.9330  5.3092  7.3303  
Readability 96 11.7958  11.6000  1.5068  10.8000  12.6000  
HomeReport 96 0.1458  0.0000  0.3548  0.0000  0.0000  
Leverage 96 0.3456  0.2828  0.2162  0.1906  0.5279  
MTB 96 1.2011  0.7776  1.2131  0.4809  1.4429  
Accruals 96 0.0809  0.0628  0.0745  0.0289  0.1015  
AuditFee 96 0.0026  0.0020  0.0026  0.0008  0.0035  
ROA 96 0.1025  0.0784  0.0930  0.0388  0.1394  
Sales 96 0.5735  0.2318  1.1705  0.1145  0.4802  
SpecialItems 96 0.0191  0.0021  0.0572  0.0000  0.0137  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Chinese Firms Sample 
CAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.08393  -0.008  -0.08389  -0.07279  0.00313  -0.07277  SHORTEN 0.03587 *** 0.04447 *** 0.05102 *** 0.02384 * 0.03244 ** 0.03899 ** 
Reconcil -0.02332  -0.01437  -0.02799  -0.03492  -0.02597  -0.03959  Assets 0.0051  0.00593  0.00907  0.00543  0.00627  0.0094  Readability 0.000683  -0.00283  -0.00064  0.000901  -0.00261  -0.00042  HomeReport -0.01126  -0.0261  -0.03307  0.00486  -0.00998  -0.01695  Leverage 0.0355  -0.00887  0.01987  0.01795  -0.02643  0.00231  MTB -0.00449  -0.00152  -0.00102  -0.00373  -0.00076  -0.00026  Accruals 0.07427  -0.03569  -0.06905  0.02008  -0.0899  -0.12325  AuditFee -1.00086  -3.89154  -4.02713  -0.75019  -3.64095  -3.77567  ROA 0.03957  0.01624  -0.02009  0.04064  0.01733  -0.01902  Sales -0.00103  0.00555  0.000573  0.0052  0.01178  0.0068  SpecialItems -0.14892  0.08114  0.08973  0.01405  0.24412  0.2527  N 96  96  96  96  96  96  R2 0.2733  0.2726  0.3431  0.2316  0.2532  0.3039  Adj. R2 0.0543   0.0534   0.1451   0.0000   0.0281   0.0941   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Chinese Firms Sample 
AVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 11.61305  14.96532  13.27655  14.39511  17.74739  16.05861  SHORTEN 1.98305  2.47589  3.38986 # 1.41843  1.91127  2.82524  Reconcil -6.65058  -7.52157  -7.38659  -6.73664  -7.60763  -7.47264  Assets -0.54549  -0.55565  -0.48173  -0.75884  -0.769  -0.69508  Readability -0.93563  -1.24769  -1.17961  -1.03571  -1.34777  -1.2797  HomeReport -0.34111  -0.72824  -2.42931  -0.23833  -0.62545  -2.32653  Leverage 5.17088  5.35173  7.84177  5.93331  6.11416  8.6042  MTB 1.63822 * 1.43912  1.28006  1.46664  1.26754  1.10848  Accruals -6.55156  -11.1711  -16.0817  -4.81387  -9.43342  -14.3441  AuditFee -287.334  -314.705  -373.875  -307.602  -334.973  -394.143  ROA -6.27668  -8.64703  -9.31176  -8.75351  -11.1239  -11.7886  Sales -0.01376  0.09813  0.08821  -0.16922  -0.05733  -0.06724  SpecialItems 1.75961  10.61102  14.13924  1.61535  10.46676  13.99498  N 96  96  96  96  96  96  R2 0.1896  0.2004  0.2058  0.1847  0.1958  0.2006  Adj. R2 -0.0546   -0.0406   -0.0335   -0.0610   -0.0466   -0.0404   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Chinese Firms Sample 
Panel D: Change Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
ΔCAR(0,+2) 96 -0.0011  -0.0011  0.0481  -0.0237  0.0119  
ΔCAR(0,+3) 96 -0.0074  -0.0078  0.0570  -0.0356  0.0190  
ΔCAR(0,+4) 96 -0.0163  -0.0084  0.0627  -0.0506  0.0169  
ΔCAR(-1,+2) 96 -0.0013  -0.0076  0.0530  -0.0306  0.0247  
ΔCAR(-1,+3) 96 -0.0097  -0.0098  0.0553  -0.0340  0.0271  
ΔCAR(-1,+4) 96 -0.0172  -0.0150  0.0619  -0.0615  0.0168  
ΔAVOL(0,+2) 96 0.3295  -0.1602  9.3945  -1.0912  0.6622  
ΔAVOL(0,+3) 96 0.2161  -0.2414  10.6723  -1.4628  0.9762  
ΔAVOL(0,+4) 96 0.1514  -0.1259  11.5300  -2.0611  1.2249  
ΔAVOL(-1,+2) 96 0.2640  -0.0092  9.5027  -1.8515  1.3331  
ΔAVOL(-1,+3) 96 0.1663  -0.2985  10.9170  -1.8949  1.6306  
ΔAVOL(-1,+4) 96 0.0674  -0.1922  11.7455  -2.3565  1.8567  
SHORTEN 96 0.5000  0.5000  0.5026  0.0000  1.0000  
LoseReconcil 96 0.0104  0.0000  0.1021  0.0000  0.0000  
ΔAccruals 96 0.0015  -0.0032  0.0819  -0.0312  0.0300  
ΔAuditFee 96 -0.0005  -0.0001  0.0017  -0.0010  0.0000  
ΔAssets 96 0.1740  0.1467  0.3133  -0.0146  0.2826  
ΔSpecialItems 96 0.0046  0.0000  0.0674  0.0000  0.0122  
ΔROA 96 -0.0016  -0.0080  0.0748  -0.0434  0.0251  
ΔSales 96 0.1803  -0.0165  1.0888  -0.1830  0.1375  
ΔReadability 96 -0.2125  0.0000  1.3916  -0.8000  0.4000  
HomeReport1 96 0.0208  0.0000  0.1436  0.0000  0.0000  
HomeReport2 96 0.0208  0.0000  0.1436  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
TABLE 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Chinese Firms Sample 
ΔCAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε       
Panel E: Abnormal Return Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.00617  -0.01243  -0.02144 * -0.00648  -0.01567  -0.02118  SHORTEN 0.00574  0.01371  0.02414 * 0.01275  0.01459  0.01896  LoseReconcil -0.08143  -0.01235  -0.10216  -0.08209  -0.02882  -0.12565 ** ΔAccruals -0.1905 ** -0.19547 ** -0.15447 * -0.08395  -0.11017  -0.11917  ΔAuditFee 0.43487  3.7049  9.68904 ** -2.67951  1.09121  9.70724 ** ΔAssets -0.00921  -0.04008  -0.04296  -0.03222  -0.04084  -0.03751  ΔSpecialItems -0.08105  -0.07876  -0.23206 * -0.03849  -0.03945  -0.16907  ΔROA 0.09193  0.14872  0.14639  0.01468  0.13228  0.11532  ΔSales 0.01045  0.0158 ** 0.01939 ** 0.0091  0.00536  0.01449 * ΔReadability -0.00121  -0.00267  0.00184  -0.00135  -0.00335  -0.00255  HomeReport1 0.02011  0.01275  0.03526  -0.002  -0.01675  0.00968  HomeReport2 0.01568  0.06416  0.08464 * 0.05786  0.02058  0.03996  N 96  96  96  96  96  96  R2 0.1842  0.2082  0.2463  0.139  0.1758  0.21  Adj. R2 0.0431   0.0714   0.1160   -0.0098   0.0333   0.0734   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Chinese Firms Sample 
ΔAVOL = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε       
Panel F: Abnormal Trading Volume Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.09307  -0.54392  -0.61793  -0.3765  -0.69213  -0.80365  SHORTEN 2.95941 # 3.98359 * 4.18025 * 3.22375 # 4.27624 * 4.4797 * 
LoseReconcil -5.06017  -7.70171  -6.73522  -3.69218  -6.29497  -5.35024  ΔAccruals -5.17548  -11.4904  -13.3847  -9.61103  -14.9117  -16.553  ΔAuditFee 280.1423  406.5079  687.6006  350.1517  480.2208  760.6799  ΔAssets -4.06693  -4.92737  -4.49383  -4.50129  -5.14398  -4.69306  ΔSpecialItems -23.6588  -28.7617  -38.1993  -20.1527  -27.2047  -36.9595  ΔROA 1.40647  4.76279  3.11504  0.92318  6.24514  4.93045  ΔSales 0.9393  1.18772  1.13242  0.95228  1.15248  1.11119  ΔReadability -0.76973  -0.89633  -1.03043  -0.81952  -0.85632  -0.9951  HomeReport1 3.93935  4.58558  12.53209  4.41422  4.83529  12.87483  HomeReport2 6.72801  9.00639  11.94233  5.80492  8.21738  11.06497  N 96  96  96  96  96  96  R2 0.1194  0.1405  0.191  0.1241  0.1428  0.1927  Adj. R2 -0.0328   -0.008   0.0511   -0.0273   -0.0054   0.0532   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. # Significant at 0.10 for a one-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
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TABLE 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Non-Chinese Firms Sample 
Panel A: Level Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
CAR(0,+2) 176 0.0023  -0.0008  0.0502  -0.0169  0.0226  
CAR(0,+3) 176 0.0029  -0.0013  0.0586  -0.0219  0.0274  
CAR(0,+4) 176 0.0051  0.0018  0.0628  -0.0233  0.0332  
CAR(-1,+2) 176 0.0034  0.0016  0.0626  -0.0219  0.0269  
CAR(-1,+3) 176 0.0040  0.0003  0.0713  -0.0245  0.0316  
CAR(-1,+4) 176 0.0062  0.0056  0.0754  -0.0260  0.0399  
AVOL(0,+2) 176 0.5051  -0.7542  4.8181  -1.5142  1.2363  
AVOL(0,+3) 176 0.5373  -0.9342  5.4802  -1.9473  1.7211  
AVOL(0,+4) 176 0.4791  -1.1134  5.9684  -2.4127  1.9929  
AVOL(-1,+2) 176 0.5620  -0.7303  5.2805  -1.8587  1.5744  
AVOL(-1,+3) 176 0.5941  -0.9336  5.9653  -2.2486  1.8840  
AVOL(-1,+4) 176 0.5359  -1.1904  6.4596  -2.7218  2.1272  
SHORTEN 176 0.5000  0.5000  0.5014  0.0000  1.0000  
Reconcil 176 0.1989  0.0000  0.4003  0.0000  0.0000  
Assets 176 8.1212  8.0831  2.4047  6.4874  9.6655  
Readability 176 11.7750  11.6000  2.2366  10.8000  12.4000  
HomeReport 176 0.3182  0.0000  0.4671  0.0000  1.0000  
Leverage 176 0.5609  0.5768  0.2474  0.3606  0.7912  
MTB 176 1.3406  0.9193  1.3964  0.4211  1.6128  
Accruals 176 0.0753  0.0567  0.0653  0.0282  0.1009  
AuditFee 176 0.0010  0.0005  0.0018  0.0002  0.0011  
ROA 176 0.0704  0.0468  0.0815  0.0162  0.0891  
Sales 176 0.2144  0.1261  0.3103  0.0438  0.2675  
SpecialItems 176 0.0162  0.0003  0.0504  0.0000  0.0083  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Non-Chinese Firms Sample 
CAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.03793  -0.03798  -0.05347  0.0008866  0.0008366  -0.01465  SHORTEN 0.00898  0.00554  0.0081  0.00929  0.00586  0.00842  Reconcil 0.00275  0.0109  0.0006112  0.00841  0.01656  0.00628  Assets -0.00196  -0.00158  0.0007333  -0.00323  -0.00285  -0.000533  Readability 0.00234  0.00272  0.00282  0.00106  0.00144  0.00154  HomeReport -0.01072  -0.01321  -0.01683  -0.00741  -0.0099  -0.01352  Leverage -0.00146  -0.00501  -0.009  0.00901  0.00545  0.00146  MTB -0.00367  -0.00465  -0.00666 * -0.000909  -0.00189  -0.0039  Accruals -0.13491 ** -0.16501 ** -0.17587 ** -0.07405  -0.10417  -0.11502  AuditFee -5.59517 ** -7.38764 ** -6.9831 ** -9.72172 *** -11.51446 *** -11.10948 *** 
ROA 0.04679  0.06907  0.07168  -0.01107  0.01122  0.01384  Sales 0.01176  0.00584  0.01255  0.0381 ** 0.03218 * 0.03889 * SpecialItems 0.36191 *** 0.3888 *** 0.40562 *** 0.40812 *** 0.43502 *** 0.45184 *** 
N 176  176  176  176  176  176  R2 0.255  0.2433  0.2279  0.1888  0.1815  0.169  Adj. R2 0.1534   0.1401   0.1226   0.0781   0.0699   0.0556   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Non-Chinese Firms Sample 
AVOL  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×Reconcil + α4×Assets + α5×Readability + α6×HomeReport + α7×Leverage + α8×MTB  
+ α9×Accruals + α10×AuditFee + α11×ROA+ α12×Sales + α13×SpecialItems + Σ industry +Σ year +ε. 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume Level Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept 1.91742  2.3901  2.00427  1.76775  2.24043  1.85461  SHORTEN -0.72551  -0.45489  -0.35116  -0.74449  -0.47388  -0.37015  Reconcil -0.0217  -0.43184  -0.40025  -0.28563  -0.69578  -0.66418  Assets 0.16521  0.17265  0.26665  0.2203  0.22773  0.32174  Readability -0.15866  -0.19138  -0.2203  -0.15685  -0.18958  -0.21850  HomeReport -0.20873  -0.23631  -0.54516  -0.68919  -0.71677  -1.02563  Leverage 0.23766  -0.0934  -0.32356  -0.04184  -0.3729  -0.60306  MTB 0.20096  0.11162  0.11078  0.14032  0.05098  0.05015  Accruals -9.31917  -10.0703  -10.8979  -10.7758  -11.5269  -12.3545  AuditFee -147.406  -173.227  -160.218  -141.548  -167.368  -154.359  ROA 12.10237 ** 12.16742 * 11.07151  12.45197 * 12.51702  11.42111  Sales 0.07831  0.09302  0.40887  0.32643  0.34114  0.65699  SpecialItems 5.23721  3.97502  3.70916  5.08835  3.82616  3.5603  N 176  176  176  176  176  176  R2 0.0619  0.0562  0.0585  0.0624  0.0575  0.06140  Adj. R2 -0.0660   -0.0725   -0.0699   -0.0655   -0.071    -0.0670   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings 
-Non-Chinese Firms Sample 
Panel D: Change Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
ΔCAR(0,+2) 176 0.0019  -0.0007  0.0471  -0.0224  0.0163  
ΔCAR(0,+3) 176 0.0023  0.0010  0.0541  -0.0271  0.0226  
ΔCAR(0,+4) 176 0.0012  0.0008  0.0537  -0.0250  0.0229  
ΔCAR(-1,+2) 176 0.0025  -0.0015  0.0548  -0.0241  0.0226  
ΔCAR(-1,+3) 176 0.0045  0.0001  0.0643  -0.0242  0.0335  
ΔCAR(-1,+4) 176 0.0029  0.0009  0.0641  -0.0313  0.0283  
ΔAVOL(0,+2) 176 0.2013  0.0320  5.2881  -0.7927  0.9942  
ΔAVOL(0,+3) 176 0.0801  -0.0589  6.0508  -1.3961  1.4935  
ΔAVOL(0,+4) 176 0.1795  0.1480  6.5235  -1.3763  1.6305  
ΔAVOL(-1,+2) 176 0.1050  -0.0586  5.8005  -1.4184  1.3671  
ΔAVOL(-1,+3) 176 -0.0422  -0.1333  6.5489  -1.9257  1.7037  
ΔAVOL(-1,+4) 176 0.0080  0.0002  6.9319  -2.1620  1.8383  
SHORTEN 176 0.5000  0.5000  0.5014  0.0000  1.0000  
LoseReconcil 176 0.0852  0.0000  0.2800  0.0000  0.0000  
ΔAccruals 176 0.0010  -0.0006  0.0596  -0.0266  0.0270  
ΔAuditFee 176 -0.0002  0.0000  0.0009  -0.0001  0.0000  
ΔAssets 176 0.0457  0.0167  0.2476  -0.0527  0.1227  
ΔSpecialItems 176 0.0067  0.0000  0.0594  -0.0010  0.0039  
ΔROA 176 0.0126  0.0002  0.0785  -0.0140  0.0239  
ΔSales 176 -0.1279  -0.0332  0.7698  -0.1600  0.0717  
ΔReadability 176 -0.4455  0.0000  2.2182  -0.8000  0.4000  
HomeReport1 176 0.0398  0.0000  0.1960  0.0000  0.0000  
HomeReport2 176 0.0341  0.0000  0.1820  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Non-Chinese Firms Sample 
ΔCAR  = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε     
Panel E: Abnormal Return Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.00364  -0.00753  -0.00124  -0.00716  -0.00977  -0.00376  SHORTEN 0.00873  0.01869 ** 0.01458 * 0.01573 * 0.02588 *** 0.02 ** LoseReconcil -0.01353  -0.02571 * -0.03173 ** -0.02254  -0.03612 ** -0.04077 ** ΔAccruals 0.00288  0.05306  0.12401  0.07794  0.05733  0.11942  ΔAuditFee 6.4651  5.6049  5.72883  3.26281  4.41429  6.94511  ΔAssets -0.01072  -0.01406  -0.01936  -0.00511  -0.01082  -0.00404  ΔSpecialItems 0.11321 * 0.11881  0.04336  0.06283  0.07004  0.02558  ΔROA 0.13153 ** 0.07544  -0.03424  0.1389 ** 0.15179 ** 0.05858  ΔSales 0.00381  0.00218  0.00202  0.00799  0.00827  0.00923  ΔReadability -0.00256  -0.00604 *** -0.00442 *** -0.00281  -0.0063 *** -0.00572 *** HomeReport1 0.01683  0.02178  0.00143  0.02044  0.02312  0.00521  HomeReport2 -0.01717  -0.01159  -0.01776  -0.01366  -0.00902  -0.01582  N 176  176  176  176  176  176  R2 0.1372  0.1572  0.1201  0.1599  0.178  0.1699  Adj. R2 0.0622   0.0839   0.0436   0.0868   0.1066   0.0978   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Market Reactions to 20-F Filings-Non-Chinese Firms Sample 
ΔAVOL = α1 + α2×SHORTEN + α3×LoseReconcil + α4×ΔAccruals + α5×ΔAuditFee + α6×ΔAssets + α7×ΔSpecialItems + α8×ΔROA  
+ α9×ΔSales + α10×ΔReadability +α11×HomeReport1 + α12×HomeReport2 +Σ year + ε       
Panel F: Abnormal Trading Volume Change Analysis 
Event Window (0,+2)  (0,+3)  (0,+4)  (-1,+2)  (-1,+3)  (-1,+4)  Intercept -0.33584  -0.5833  -0.50416  -0.48573  -0.81124  -0.87064  SHORTEN 0.19945  0.178  0.12739  0.30082  0.26718  0.38485  LoseReconcil 1.5247  1.6772  1.54609  1.38499  1.58346  1.26165  ΔAccruals -8.37249  -7.46593  -8.58038  -9.15353  -9.02063  -8.6611  ΔAuditFee 93.17781  312.1297  354.678  72.50938  320.0837  367.3392  ΔAssets -3.15055  -2.30979  -1.66371  -2.06567  -1.09693  -0.34877  ΔSpecialItems 3.83012  2.10278  -0.05712  2.9367  0.96958  -1.54867  ΔROA 7.55984  7.49051  8.70522  9.42093  11.61411  11.10617  ΔSales -0.0899  -0.31719  -0.31283  -0.27548  -0.51067  -0.63859  ΔReadability -0.26372  -0.28393  -0.29135  -0.29257  -0.32374  -0.31901  HomeReport1 -1.05747  -0.77575  -0.07496  -2.03227  -1.64902  -0.85858  HomeReport2 -0.46235  -0.87668  -0.41802  -1.11651  -1.46333  -1.05492  N 176  176  176  176  176  176  R2 0.0607  0.0464  0.038  0.0506  0.0476  0.0394  Adj. R2 -0.0210   -0.036   -0.0457   -0.0319   -0.0352   -0.0441   
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
* / ** / *** Significant at 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 for a two-tailed t-test of means. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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A P P E N D I X 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Accrual Income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows, 
scaled by average total assets. 
Assets  The log of fiscal year end total assets. 
AuditFee Current year audit fees, scaled by average total assets. 
AVOL The cumulative abnormal trading volumes for the 20-F filing date in 
a designated test window. Abnormal trading volumes is measured 
as the difference between actual trading volume and mean trading 
volume in the window (-49, -5), scaled by the standard deviation of 
trading volume in the window (-49, -5). 
CAR The absolute cumulative abnormal returns for the 20-F filing date in a 
designated test window. Abnormal return is measured as the 
difference between actual return and predicted return calculated 
from market model OLS regression during the days -260 to -11 
estimation period. 
HomeReport 1 if the firm has released an annual report in its home country before 
the firm releases the 20-F, else 0. 
HomeReport1 1 if a firm released a home annual report before 20-F release in the 
previous year but not in the current year, else 0. 
HomeReport2 1 if a firm released a home annual report before 20-F release in the 
current year but not in the previous year, else 0. 
Large 1 if a firm has $700 million public float or more, else 0. 
Leverage Debt to asset ratio. 
LoseReconcil  1 if a firm stopped disclosing income reconciliation from home 
GAAP to U.S. GAAP in current year, else 0. 
Medium 1 if a firm has less than $700 million but no less than 75 million 
public float, else 0. 
MTB Market to book ratio. 
Readability FOG  index calculated as (words per sentence + percent of complex 
words) * 0.4. 
Reconcil 1 if a firm disclose income reconciliation from home GAAP to U.S. 
GAAP in the current year, else 0. 
ROA Current year net income scaled by average total assets. 
Sales  Current year total revenue. 
SHORTEN 1 if a firm shortened its reporting lag by at least 20 days from last 
year to current year. 
Small 1 if a firm has less than 75 million public float, else 0. 
SpecialItems  Current year special items, scaled by average total assets. 
  
Note:                                                                                                                                                              
For all change (Δ) variables, I take the absolute value of each variable in each firm-year and then compute 
the difference. 
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